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I.  Introduction
The challenging job market for recent law school graduates has highlighted 
a fact well-known to those familiar with legal education: A signifi cant gap 
exists between what students learn in law school and what they ne ed to 
be practice-ready lawyers. 1 Until recently, legal employers took on the task 
of training graduates, whether through formal programs or one-on-one 
mentoring. However, market pressures and budget constraints have led 
many legal employers to eliminate or signifi cantly reduce the training they 
used to supply.2 The resulting skills gap aff ects the ability of young lawyers 
1. See, e.g., ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 137 (1953) (“all [law 
schools] can be grouped under one heading, that the schools do not adequately prepare 
students for the tasks they will have to perform in the practice.”); ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING 
FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PRINCIPAL 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH SOME 
ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 281 (1921) (stating that “the failure of 
modern American law school to make any adequate provision in its curriculum for practical 
training constitutes a remarkable educational anomaly.”); Jerome Frank, Why Not A Clinical 
Lawyer School?, 81 U. PENN. L. REV. 1907 (1933). As described more fully below, law schools 
have made signifi cant strides in this regard over the past 50 years, but critics remain 
dissatisfi ed. See, infra, sources cited in note 12.
  The training gap is distinct from the question of whether law schools are producing too 
many lawyers. Even if the number of graduates were perfectly matched to available jobs, 
legal employers would complain that the graduates lacked the practical skills necessary 
to be a lawyer. Addressing the supply-and-demand question is beyond the scope of this 
Article.
2. Neil J. Dilloff , Law School Training: Bridging the Gap Between Legal Education and the Practice of Law, 24 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 431-33 (2013).
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to secure employment and advance in their careers, as well as the quality of 
representation clients receive.
At the same time, many Americans simply cannot aff ord to hire attorneys.3 
The unmet need for high-quality, aff ordable legal services aff ects not only the 
destitute and near-destitute, but also many in the middle class. The scope of 
the problem is diffi  cult to gauge, but by some estimates poor people’s legal 
needs go unmet up to eighty percent of the time and middle class people’s 
legal needs go unmet up to sixty percent of the time. 4 Insuffi  cient access to 
aff ordable legal services is bad not just for those who must do without, but 
also for society as a whole. Among other disadvantages, lack of access to legal 
advice undermines the rule of law and fl oods the courts with pro se litigants 
who do not understand how the system works.
Over the past several years, a number of law schools have begun to 
experiment with postgraduate training programs designed to address these 
twin market failures. 5 Such programs take many forms, but they typically 
involve new lawyers working for paying clients at below-market rates under 
the supervision of more-seasoned attorneys.6 In this way, new lawyers can 
gain needed training and experience while providing legal services to those 
currently unable to aff ord lawyers. However, funding issues and tax law 
considerations may stymie these training programs unless they are carefully 
structured.
In this Article we consider a number of questions regarding how best to 
structure postgraduate legal training programs to achieve these dual purposes. 
In Parts II and III we make the case for postgraduate legal training as a good 
3. We focus here on civil representation and do not comment on the quantity or quality of 
public defender services.
4. See Emily A. Spieler, The Paradox of Access to Civil Justice: The “Glut” of New Lawyers and the Persistence 
of Unmet Need, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 365, 369-76 (2013) (assessing the extent to which we can 
measure unmet legal needs).
5. For a listing of the schools that have implemented some form of postgraduate legal training, 
see Incubator/Residency Programs, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
delivery_legal_services/initiatives_awards/program_main.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
  The idea of law school-affi  liated postgraduate training is not new. Rutgers considered 
creating such a program in the late 1990s, but it never got off  the ground. For a discussion 
of that proposal, see Andrew J. Rothman, Preparing Law School Graduates for Practices: A Blueprint 
for Professional Education Following the Medical Profession Example, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 875 (1999). 
See also Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response to the 
Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105 (2001) (focusing 
on providing legal services to pro se litigants, but recognizing the training opportunities). 
For a more recent exposition of this idea, see Bradley T. Borden & Robert J. Rhee, The Law 
School Firm, 63 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2011).
6. Some law schools are paying recent graduates to do postgraduate internships at public-
interest employers. See, e.g., Liza Dee & Cory Weinberg, In Dim Job Market, Law School Pays 
More Graduates to Work (Feb. 7, 2013), GW HATCHET, http://www.gwhatchet.com/2013/02/07/
in-dim-job-market-law-school-pays-more-graduates-to-work/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2015). 
Participants get work experience and can build networks that might lead to jobs down the 
road. Such programs are not self-sustaining and we do not address them here.
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way to address the skills and legal services gaps, and we consider program 
design issues such as (1) whether law schools should take the lead in developing 
these programs, (2) whether programs should operate as incubators for solo 
practitioners or more like medical residency programs, and (3) whether they 
should be housed within a law school or operated as separate entities.
We argue that, while other organizations could create such programs, law 
schools should take the lead because they are in the best position to do so. Law 
schools have signifi cant experience with clinical education that bears directly 
on the training mission. Incubator programs require far fewer resources than 
do full-blown residency programs, and schools must determine for themselves 
which kind of program they prefer. Incubators fi t better within a law school 
setting, while residency programs should probably be established as stand-
alone entities.
In Part IV we turn to the important tax issues postgraduate training 
programs raise. We begin by positing that tax exemption is important because 
it will facilitate fundraising, may help attract clients, and could mollify the local 
bar, which might view such programs as a threat. We then tackle the normative 
question of whether such programs should qualify as charitable organizations 
eligible for tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3). We do so because there is 
no authority directly on point, and understanding the policy will shape the way 
in which relevant authorities should be construed. We conclude that, while 
postgraduate legal training programs may not look like traditional schools or 
charities, they nonetheless are worthy of tax exemption because they address 
the market failures that lead to the skills and legal services gaps.
We consider next whether such programs qualify for exemption under 
current guidance. Programs operated within law schools will partake of their 
host institutions’ tax-exempt status and should not aff ect it, except in extreme 
and unlikely circumstances. Stand-alone programs are more complicated 
because they must apply for tax-exemption in their own right. Properly 
designed postgraduate training programs should qualify under two diff erent 
lines of authority. First, law school-affi  liated programs can be granted an 
exemption because they support the educational mission of their affi  liated law 
school. Second, programs should receive an exemption in their own right, 
whether or not affi  liated with a law school, because they serve an educational 
purpose. The key issue is whether providing legal services to paying clients 
constitutes an impermissible, non-exempt purpose.7 We argue that such 
activities are permitted under both general guidance and the specifi c guidance 
7. Legal aid organizations that serve the poor are allowed to charge nominal fees based on 
ability to pay, Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-2 C.B. 177, and this could arguably be a basis on which 
tax exemption could be granted. However, given the need of most programs to charge 
more than nominal fees, we do not believe that relief of the poor and distressed is likely 
to be an independent basis to make a claim for exemption in most cases. Reaching out to 
underserved communities may help distinguish the program from for-profi t organizations, 
but pursuing that as the basis is likely to fail in most cases under current law. Whether low-
bono services should warrant a tax exemption is beyond the scope of this Article.
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addressing on-the-job training. We off er a model program that should fi t 
within existing guidance and call on the IRS to issue specifi c guidance setting 
forth the parameters under which these programs will qualify as charitable 
organizations.
II.  The Need for Postgraduate Training Programs
This Part briefl y sets forth the challenges facing legal education and the 
diffi  culties that arise from the lack of aff ordable legal services. These challenges 
support the case we make in Part IV on why these programs are worthy of tax 
exemption. Those already convinced that these problems are real may wish 
to skip ahead to Part III, which addresses design considerations, or Part IV, 
which focuses on the tax issues.
A.  The Skills Gap
Legal education in America was originally provided through an apprentice 
system, where would-be lawyers worked for established lawyers until they 
gained suffi  cient knowledge and skills to be called to the bar. 8 The fi rst law 
schools appeared in the early 1800s9 and quickly displaced apprenticeship as 
the primary path to becoming a lawyer.10 The modern law school curriculum 
was developed in the 1890s, and it focused on legal theory, as opposed to 
practice.11 Not surprisingly, newly minted lawyers coming from the law schools 
lacked the experience and many of the practical skills typical of those who had 
gone through years of apprenticeship. This change did not go unnoticed, and 
from the very beginning, critics complained that law schools failed to produce 
“practice-ready” lawyers. 12 Initially, legal employers provided on-the-job 
training, but as market conditions have changed, they have steadily reduced 
the amount of training they provide, leaving a skills-training vacuum.13
8. For a history of legal education in America, see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, 
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the organization of the bar and how 
lawyers were educated during diff erent periods).
9. See STEVENS, supra note 8, at 5.
10. Id. at 7.
11. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1949, 1973 (2012).
12. See supra, sources cited in note 1. Of signifi cant recent note are the two American Bar 
Association (ABA) studies on this issue, the so-called Cramton and MacCrate Reports, and 
the more recent Carnegie Foundation Report. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. 
AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS (1979); AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND 
THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—
AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: 
PREPARATION FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2007).
13. See Dilloff  supra note 2; see also, STATE BAR OF WIS., CHALLENGES TO THE PROFESSION COMM., 
THE CHALLENGES FACING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2011), http://www.reinhartlaw.com/
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Over the past 30 years, law schools have increased their practical training 
by setting up a wide range of legal clinics, creating professionally staff ed 
legal writing programs, expanding externship opportunities, and developing 
professional skills and simulation courses in topics ranging from trial advocacy 
to business planning. The number of client contact hours and amount of 
experiential learning that graduates now have is staggering when compared 
to just 20 years ago. Despite these advances, critics remain unsatisfi ed with 
the amount of practical training law students receive and are pushing for even 
greater skills training within law schools. 14
Unfortunately, increasing skills training within the existing law school 
curriculum would require either a signifi cant increase in tuition to pay for 
such training15 or a radical reworking of the current system to focus on skills 
training. Regardless of the merits of such suggestions, such a restructuring 
seems unlikely in the short run.
services/buslaw/corpgovern/documents/art1111%20te.pdf; Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal 
Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 598, 605-06 (2010).
14. See, e.g., DEBORAH MARANVILLE ET AL., BUILDING ON BEST PRACTICES: TRANSFORMING LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD (2015); ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL 
EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP (2007). Both are projects of the Clinical Legal 
Education Association.
  Over the past few years, both the ABA and a number of state bar associations have moved 
to increase skills requirements. The ABA has done so as part of its accreditation powers, 
requiring students to take at least six hours of experiential learning. See AM. BAR ASS’N, 2015-
2016 STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, at 16 (Standard 
303(a)(3)) (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/
legal_education/Standards/2015_2016_chapter_3.authcheckdam.pdf. The New York 
and California bar associations are considering adopting practical skills requirements for 
applicants to their respective bars. See, e.g., COMM. ON LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, 
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (2014), https://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.
aspx?id=46440 (discussing the need for greater skills training for new lawyers and 
contemplating requiring bar applicants to have 12 hours of such training, whether through 
clinics, externships or simulation courses, before being admitted to the bar); TASK FORCE ON 
ADMISSION REGULATION REFORM, STATE BAR OF CAL., PHASE I FINAL REPORT (2013), http://
board.calbar.ca.gov/docs/agendaItem/Public/agendaitem1000010717.pdf (recommending 
that applicants to the California State Bar be required to take 15 credit hours of experiential 
learning while in law school).
15. While one professor can easily teach 100 students in a core doctrinal course, clinical training 
and writing classes require much smaller ratios. Robert Kuehn asserts that eighty-four 
percent of all law schools already have the capacity to provide a clinical experience to every 
student and that no diff erences in tuition exist between those schools that can provide such 
experiences to all students and those that cannot. See Robert R. Kuehn, Pricing Clinical Legal 
Education, 92 DENV. L. REV. 1 (2014). However, the cost of additional resources necessary to 
produce practice-ready lawyers would be prohibitive. One might think that schools could 
use adjuncts for this purpose, because they both are less expensive than regular faculty and 
have ongoing practice experience. However, these courses are often so labor intensive that 
adjuncts may be unwilling to commit the time necessary. In addition, not every law school 
is located near a large pool of adjuncts.
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Asking legal employers to train young lawyers also appears to be a non-
starter. Small fi rms often lack the capacity to train young lawyers, while 
pressure to maintain the all-important profi ts per partner number creates 
strong incentives for larger fi rms to reduce or eliminate training.16 Clients are 
increasingly unwilling to pay for associate training,17 leading large fi rms to hire 
fewer fi rst year associates.18 High lawyer mobility also creates disincentives 
for legal employers to train because such training will only benefi t future 
employers. Nor does the future off er much hope.19
16. Indeed, there is signifi cant economic pressure not to hire recent graduates, with the common 
wisdom being that law fi rms lose money on associates until their third year. See, e.g., Gregory 
W. Bowman, Big Firm Economics 101: Why Are Associate Salaries So High?, LAW CAREER BLOG (Feb. 
7, 2006), http://law-career.blogspot.com/2006/02/big-fi rm-economics-101-why-are.html 
(suggesting that most fi rms don’t break even on associates until their third year of practice); 
Debra L. Bruce, A Law Firm Associate’s Primer on Law Firm Economics, LAWYER COACH (June 10, 
2013), http://www.lawyer-coach.com/index.php/2013/06/10/a-law-fi rm-associates-primer-
on-law-fi rm-economics/ (indicating that large fi rms she surveyed claimed that they needed 
to collect $350,000 per associate to break even and associates were not profi table for such 
fi rms until around the fourth year); but see Ed Wessernan, Why Aren’t Associates More Profi table?, 
ED WESSERMAN (May 25, 2009), http://edwesemann.com/articles/profi tability/2009/05/25/
why-arent-associates-more-profi table/ (arguing that the purported lack of profi tability may 
derive from simplistic accounting practices that improperly assign overhead to associates).




marketplace_0 (noting that many general counsel are now unwilling to pay for fi rst-year 
associate time).
18. In 2008, nineteen percent of all attorneys found jobs at fi rms with over 251 lawyers. In 
2011, that number dropped to 10.5 percent. Christopher J. Gearon, Reality Check for Law 
Firm Associates, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2012/11/01/reality-check-for-law-fi rm-associates.
19. Technology and the ability to outsource legal work to other countries is likely to reduce 
the number of associates needed. See, e.g., Michael G. Owen, Legal Outsourcing to India: The 
Demise of New Lawyers and Junior Associates, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 175 
(2008). Moreover, fi rms may be shifting from the well-known pyramid structure to a new 
“diamond” structure, in which fi rms are populated primarily by midlevel lawyers, with a 
small group of equity owners and young associates on either side. See William Henderson 
& Evan Parker, The Diamond Law Firm, A New Model or the Pyramid Unraveling?, LAWYER METRICS 
(Dec. 3, 2013), http://lawyermetrics.com/2013/12/03/the-diamond-law-fi rm-a-new-model-or-
the-pyramid-unraveling/. Worse yet, from a training perspective, is the predicted rise of 
virtual fi rms, where individual lawyers with diff erent skills sets will come together to create 
ad hoc fi rms for individual cases or transactions. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S 
LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE (2013). Such “fi rms” are anticipated to be 
highly competitive and indeed may supplant traditional fi rms because they will likely have 
low overhead and the fl exibility to add or cut members as needed. Because they will employ 
only those essential to the case or transaction in question, the impetus to train young lawyers 
will be greatly diminished.
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B.  The Legal Services Gap
Law faculties are also well aware of the shortage of high-quality, aff ordable 
legal services. Legal fees have risen so high that a large number of Americans 
simply can’t aff ord to hire a lawyer. A recent survey by the National Law Journal 
showed median fi rmwide billing rates of respondents for 2012 to be $425 per 
hour. Even outside the major metropolitan areas, rates are quite high. A 2013 
survey in Arizona revealed that the median hourly rate was $255 per hour, with 
the average at $280.20 The rates vary by practice area, years of experience, fi rm 
size, and location within the state, but rates at the 25th percentile rarely fall 
below $200. This means that 20 hours of work typically costs around $5,000, 
a signifi cant amount for someone who earns $50,000 per year.21
For the very poorest, free legal services are nominally available through 
the Legal Services Corporation and the organizations they fund. However, 
such organizations have restrictions on the types of cases they can take,22 and 
the income levels at which people lose eligibility are so low that only a small 
number qualify.23  Even with these limitations, the funding for these types of 
services is nowhere near adequate to cover the needs of those who qualify.24 
Indeed, government funding for legal services to the poor is constantly under 
attack and unlikely to be increased in the near future.25
Many state bar organizations have implemented “modest means” programs, 
where lawyers agree to represent customers up to two hundred fi fty percent of 
20. STATE BAR OF ARIZ., 2013 ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN ARIZONA (2013).
21. The reasons for the market’s failure to produce lawyers willing and able to provide legal 
services in the range between $100 and $200 per hour are puzzling. In a recent report, 
the Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York suggested that rising student debt precludes lawyers from entering 
public service or entering practices where they can charge aff ordable rates but the lack of 
reasonably priced legal services predates the recent rise in law school debt. COMM. ON LEGAL 
EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., LAW SCHOOL DEBT AND THE PRACTICE 
OF LAW, http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/lawSchoolDebt.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
22. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., APPENDIX A: AUDIT GUIDE FOR 
RECIPIENTS AND AUDITORS,  http://www.oig.lsc.gov/aud/cs98/cs98r.pdf (last visited Nov. 
22, 2015) (Compliance Supplement).
23. The Federal Poverty Guidelines for 2015 set the poverty level for individuals at $11,770 
and for a family of four at $24,250. 2015 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS. (2015), http://aspe.hhs.gov/2015-poverty-guidelines#threshholds. Legal services 
organizations predominately provide free services to those who are at or lower than 125% of 
the federal poverty level. See Who We Are, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc/
who-we-are (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); Consumer’s Guide to Legal Help: Finding Free Help, AM. 
BAR ASS’N (Feb. 5, 2015) , http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/fi ndlegalhelp/faq_
freehelp.cfm.
24. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT 
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/
default/fi les/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pd.
25. See, e.g., House Spending Bill Cuts LSC Budget By 20%, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (June 3, 2015), http://
www.lsc.gov/media-center/press-releases/2015/house-spending-bill-cuts-lsc-budget-20.
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the federal poverty level for $75 per hour.26 However, this barely puts a dent 
into the demand. By some accounts, up to sixty percent of middle-class legal 
needs go unmet.27 Self-help solutions exist, such as Legal Zoom28 and Nolo 
Press,29 but such aids are no substitute for a trained attorney, especially when 
matters stray beyond the routine.
The sad state of aff airs was perhaps best captured by the ABA in its 2013 
draft report on potential changes to legal education:
[T]he services of these highly trained professionals may not be cost-eff ective 
for many actual or potential clients, and some communities and constituencies 
lack realistic access to essential legal services . . . .
The current misdistribution of legal services and common lack of access 
to legal advice of any kind requires innovative and aggressive remediation.30
The lack of legal representation not only harms those who cannot aff ord 
lawyers, but it also imposes signifi cant costs on society, writ large. For 
instance, pro se litigants impose signifi cant costs on the legal system. As Chief 
Justice Chase Rogers of the Connecticut Supreme Court has noted, pro se 
litigants “clog up the court system. Cases are delayed and lengthened, creating 
frustration for everybody.”31 This problem is especially acute in family law 
courts,32 though it is experienced elsewhere. Pro se litigants need assistance in 
26. See, e.g., MODEST MEANS PROJECT, http://www.azfl se.org/modestmeans/ (last visited Nov. 
22, 2015).
27. See Spieler, supra note 4.
28. Welcome to Legal Zoom, LEGAL ZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/index-new-c.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2015).
29. NOLO, http://www.nolo.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).
30. See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., DRAFT REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/taskforcecomments/task_force_on_legaleducation_draft_
report_september2013.authcheckdam.pdf (hereinafter ABA DRAFT REPORT).
31. Editorial, Coping with Pro Se Litigants, CONN. L. TRIB., JUNE 17, 2013, at 29.
32. A 1990 survey found that in fi fty-two percent of Arizona divorces, neither party was 
represented, while in approximately eight-eight percent one party was not represented. 
BRUCE D. SALES ET AL., SELF-REPRESENTATION IN DIVORCE CASES (1993). Other states reported 
similar statistics. See Berenson, supra note 5, at 109.
  One solution to this problem could be to allow paralegals or others with limited training 
to handle these types of disputes. Washington State has recently issuing limited licenses to 
legal technicians in this area. See Limited License Legal Technician Board, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.wsba.org/Legal-Community/Committees-Boards-and-Other-Groups/Limited-
License-Legal-Technician-Board (last visited Nov. 19, 2015). While this approach may help 
some clients, it is also fraught because client needs may go beyond the scope of permissible 
practice, and those with limited training may miss important legal issues. Moreover, it does 
not address the lawyer training issues focused on here.
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fi lling out forms and help from judges during hearings and trials.33  Cases that 
should settle go to trial; trials can take a lot longer than necessary.
Equally troubling is the fact that justice may not be served. Pro se litigants 
with good cases may lose because they do not understand the rules of evidence 
or fail to introduce necessary evidence because they do not understand the 
legal standard.34 In addition, judges may be inclined to help those without 
lawyers, thus abandoning their neutral position; or they may sit back and 
watch pro se litigants with winning cases lose.35 Neither outcome is good.
Pro se representation can also lead to the law developing in unfortunate 
ways. In our adversarial system, we rely on the parties to brief the issues so that 
the judges can make good decisions on both the facts (in bench trials) and the 
law. Pro se litigants do not always make the best arguments, depriving judges 
of the opportunity to see all sides of a legal issue, which can lead to bad law.36
III.  Postgraduate Training Design Considerations
So, how might we tackle these twin problems? Postgraduate legal training 
programs can help new lawyers gain the skills and experience they need to be 
successful lawyers, while addressing the legal services gap. Given the scope 
of the problems, such programs are unlikely to solve them fully, but they are 
certainly a step in the right direction.
Once one accepts that postgraduate legal training programs are desirable, 
questions arise as to how best to structure them. The fi rst question is whether 
law schools should take the lead in establishing and operating such programs. 
The next question focuses on whether programs should operate as incubators, 
with recent graduates operating their own law practices, or more like medical 
residency programs, where attorneys work for the program, which is responsible 
for generating work. The fi nal question is whether the program should operate 
as part of the law school or as a stand-alone entity. In this Part, we focus on 
these design decisions.
33. SALES, ET AL., supra note 32, at 112–17.
34. Studies have shown that, in the low-income context, represented parties in the U.S. Tax 
Court do roughly twice as well as those who litigate pro se. See OFFICE OF THE TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE, LOW INCOME TAXPAYER CLINICS PROGRAM REPORT 9 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p5066.pdf. While some of the diff erence may stem from the fact that represented 
parties may settle more losing cases, it likely does not account for the entire diff erence.
35. Id.
36. For instance, in In re the Shaheen Trust, 341 P.3d 1169 (2015), pro se benefi ciaries alleged that 
a trustee had breached its trust. The trustee counterclaimed, arguing that the benefi ciaries 
should forfeit their interests under a no-contest clause. Id. at 1170. The trial court and court of 
appeals both held that alleging a breach of trust was tantamount to challenging the validity 
of a disposition, triggering a forfeiture of their interests. Id. at 1170-71. Had the benefi ciaries 
hired lawyers, this issue likely would have been decided diff erently. At the very least, it 
would have been squarely presented.
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A.  Why Should Law Schools Create and Operate Postgraduate Training Programs?
Acknowledging that there is a gap between legal training and the skills law 
graduates need for practice and that there are unmet needs for legal services is 
not the same as concluding that law schools should take the lead in addressing 
either problem. As noted above, neither law schools nor legal employers seem 
poised to act, leaving law schools and other nonprofi ts. Traditional legal 
nonprofi ts, such as state bar associations and the ABA, provide some training 
to their members and facilitate their members providing pro bono and low-
bono work, but it seems highly unlikely that they would create programs of 
the scope or size we are discussing. The same goes for governmental agencies. 
This leaves law schools, which are dedicated to teaching and to the success 
of their graduates and have an abiding interest in the legal system, writ large, 
including access to legal services. Moreover, they have experience with legal 
clinics that they can draw on in designing and running postgraduate programs.
This is not to suggest that only law schools should create such programs. 
Indeed, many lawyers would likely relish the opportunity to train young 
lawyers while helping people who cannot otherwise aff ord legal representation. 
Rather, in the current environment, law schools may be in the best position to 
create such programs, in part because their students are directly aff ected by the 
skills gap, and it could be easier for law school-affi  liated programs to obtain 
tax exemption. Once the models in their various forms have been established 
and put through their paces, it would make sense to encourage others to step 
in and create their own postgraduate training programs.
B.  Incubator v. Residency
Postgraduate training programs come in many forms, and law schools must 
decide whether the programs should operate as incubators or residencies. 
Incubators are typically aimed at those interested in establishing their own 
law practices.37 Law schools provide space, some infrastructure, and a mentor 
to help participants. Most incubators rely on the participants to generate their 
own work, obtain their own malpractice insurance, and establish their own 
IOLTA accounts,38 among other tasks. In contrast, residency programs operate 
more like traditional fi rms in that they have practice areas run by seasoned 
attorneys. The resident attorneys work for the program, which is responsible 
for setting up the infrastructure and generating the work.
37. See, for example, the incubator programs operating at the California Western School of 
Law and the Thomas Jeff erson School of Law. See Incubator/Residency Program Profi les, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal_services/initiatives_awards/
program_main/program_profi les.html?cq_ck=1425594085817 (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) 
(hereinafter ABA Program Profi les).
38. Most lawyers must establish trust accounts, referred to as IOLTA accounts, to hold client 
money. For a discussion of such accounts in Arizona, see Trust Account, ARIZ. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.azbar.org/media/50359/trustaccount.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
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Incubators generally require far less in the way of planning, infrastructure, 
or institutional commitment than do residency programs. They also pose 
far less risk.39  Participants bear much of the economic risk if they cannot 
generate business, and the law schools are generally not seen to be engaged 
in the practice of law, with all the risk that entails. This perhaps explains why 
incubators are the most popular form of postgraduate training programs to 
date.40
However, incubators may not meet the needs or goals of every kind of law 
graduate. Not every graduate wants to establish a solo practice, especially 
right out of law school, or has the capacity to generate suffi  cient business off  of 
which to live. Residency programs can provide fi nancial security by paying the 
new lawyers and assuming the responsibility of generating the work. They may 
also allow for a more controlled experience, one where trained lawyers educate 
and mentor new lawyers in a way that incubators cannot typically accomplish. 
However, residency programs are far more expensive and complicated than 
simple incubators and may encounter greater resistance from the practicing 
bar because of concerns over competition. Nonetheless, on balance, we believe 
that residency-like programs can provide a better training environment, have 
the potential to train a signifi cantly larger number of lawyers, and can provide 
more legal services to those who currently go without. Accordingly, these 
programs deserve serious consideration.
C.  Should Programs Be Established Within or Outside of Law Schools?
Another important decision is whether programs should be housed within 
law schools or created as stand-alone entities. Internal programs could be 
operated as a law school activity, like moot court, or through a separate legal 
entity, such as a single-member LLC or a nonprofi t corporation.41 Stand-alone 
programs would be established as a new legal entity. This decision involves a 
number of diff erent considerations, many of which push in diff erent directions.
Locating the program within a law school or as part of the broader university 
off ers a number of benefi ts. First and foremost, schools can maintain control 
over personnel, direction, selection of participants, etc. Moreover, law school 
programs may have access to university resources, including facilities, human 
resources, and personnel, including the general counsel’s offi  ce. They may also 
be able to off er university benefi ts to employees. Locating programs within 
law schools may also make it easier to get faculty involved and to ensure that 
39. Obviously, the law school could be subjected to vicarious liability for its connection to the 
incubator, but it is unlikely that incubators present the same type of malpractice problems 
as does a residency-style postgraduate legal training program.
40. See ABA Program Profi les, supra note 37, for a description of law school-affi  liated postgraduate 
training programs.
41. In some cases, this approach may not be possible because of state law. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST., 
ART IX, § 7 (precluding state agencies from owning other organizations). Other issues 
with corporate documents or state charters may arise, but they are beyond the scope of this 
article. 
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any knowledge the program generates is passed along to those responsible 
for designing and implementing the law school curriculum. Finally, locating 
programs within law schools may also help brand the program and promote 
the school. In particular, it may highlight the ways in which the school is 
embedded in the local community and engaged in addressing community 
concerns, needs, and issues.42 It may also help attract clients who might 
otherwise distrust lawyers.
However, locating a postgraduate program within a law school or university 
also entails a number of risks. For instance, it may subject the university to 
legal liability should there be malpractice.43 While these risks already exist 
with clinics and can be off set with insurance, postgraduate programs may 
increase the risk. Even absent malpractice, the practice of law can be quite 
contentious, and both the client and lawyer on the other side may harbor ill 
will toward the institution. Clients also may develop unrealistic expectations 
and blame their lawyers if things go wrong. Disgruntled individuals could 
engage in a wide range of activities, including suing the university, posting 
derogatory comments online, or even complaining to local politicians. Such 
complaints could create problems, especially for state universities.
Postgraduate training programs also run the risk of alienating law school 
alumni, who might perceive them as competition. Unlike clinics, which 
represent pro bono clients, most postgraduate programs, or the lawyers 
participating in them, will represent at least some paying clients. Schools need 
to be wary of competing against their own graduates or otherwise antagonizing 
them.44
To the extent that incubator programs simply provide infrastructure and 
some mentoring to new lawyers who are setting up their own practices, the 
risks seem fairly low, and housing such programs within a law school makes 
sense. In contrast, residency programs likely are best created as stand-alone 
entities. While the law school might be seen as the creative force behind such 
programs, the diminished control and management shield schools from at 
least some of the fi nancial and political fallout, if any.
VI.  Tax Exemption and the Postgraduate Legal Training Program
Any postgraduate legal training program will likely want to take advantage 
of the benefi ts of operating as a tax-exempt charitable organization. As 
42. For an example of this approach, see Arizona State University, whose design aspirations 
include social embeddedness and transforming society. See A NEW AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, 
http://newamericanuniversity.asu.edu/#1 (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
43. The university could create the program as a separate legal entity within the university’s 
corporate family, but there is always the concern that the corporate or LLC veil could be 
pierced or some agency relationship be found.
44. In some cases, state law prohibits state actors from competing in areas where the private 
market functions. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-2753.
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described below, postgraduate legal training programs located within law 
schools will generally not need to seek tax-exempt status. Most ABA-accredited 
law schools are either tax-exempt organizations under Internal Revenue 
Code (“Code”) Section 501(c)(3) or operated by a state,45 and under most 
circumstances programs located within such schools will be automatically be 
considered tax-exempt. The question in this situation is whether a program’s 
activity could jeopardize the law school’s tax-exempt status or subject the 
school to the unrelated business income tax (UBIT). In contrast, stand-alone 
programs must consider whether to seek tax-exempt status and, if so, whether 
they would qualify for such status under current law and IRS guidance. This 
Part explores these important questions.
Professor Colombo has written a thoughtful article on this topic, focusing 
primarily on programs operated within law schools. 46 We generally agree with 
his assessment that such programs should not create any tax problems for law 
schools that establish them. Colombo’s brief discussion of stand-alone fi rms 
focuses on “commerciality” and the cases that involve charitable organizations 
operating for-profi t businesses. He concludes that it is unclear whether they 
could obtain tax exemption. We argue that a properly designed postgraduate 
training program should qualify for exempt status under a diff erent line of 
authority that addresses charitable organizations that provide on-the-job 
training. Moreover, its income, if any, should not be subject to UBIT. 
A.  Why Tax Exemption?
Before turning to the existing law and guidance, we discuss the benefi ts of 
tax exemption as well as the normative question of whether such programs 
should qualify for tax exemption. As discussed below, especially in the context 
of stand-alone programs, the authorities are not directly on point, and tax 
authorities will have some discretion on how to apply them. Considering the 
question from a theoretical perspective fi rst provides guidance as to how they 
should exercise it.
1.  The Benefits of Tax-Exempt Status
Most programs will not generate signifi cant income, raising the question 
of why tax exemption matters. Charitable status under Code Section 
501(c)(3) would provide postgraduate training programs a number of benefi ts, 
the most important of which might be the ability to raise money from donors. 
Creating and maintaining a postgraduate legal training program could be 
quite expensive. While most programs will likely charge fees, the fees may 
not be suffi  cient to cover all costs. Even if a program can break even, it seems 
45. For a list of ABA-accredited law schools, see ABA Approved Law Schools, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/
in_alphabetical_order.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).
46. John D. Colombo, The Federal Tax Exemption Aspects of Law Schools Running Their Own Law Firms, 72 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 153 (2013) [hereinafter Colombo, Tax Exemption Aspects].
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highly unlikely that any program would be self-sustaining for the fi rst several 
years. Fundraising may be critical to getting stand-alone programs up and 
running and could permit them to off er additional pro bono and low-bono 
services, thus increasing the demand for services and the opportunities for 
participating attorneys to receive training.
While programs could certainly solicit tax-free gifts,47 charitable status 
under Code Section 501(c)(3) would permit donors to deduct such gifts 
as charitable contributions under Code Section 170.48 Moreover, it would 
signifi cantly increase the likelihood that private foundations and governments 
would be willing to make grants. Private foundation rules require foundations 
to make signifi cant grants each year49 to accomplish charitable purposes.50 
While foundations can give to taxable entities, they risk a signifi cant penalty 
and potentially their tax-exempt status if (1) they do not annually pay enough 
out to support charitable activity51 or (2) they do not closely scrutinize the 
use of money provided to non-charitable organizations to ensure it is used 
for charitable purposes.52 As a result, foundations rarely make grants to 
organizations that are not public charities.53 Additionally, government grants 
are often dependent upon the organization being a nonprofi t organization.54 
47. I.R.C. § 102 (2012).
48. Charitable contributions to government entities, their political subdivisions, and some 
organizations whose income is exempt from tax under Code Section 115 are also deductible. 
I.R.C. § 115 (2012). For a brief discussion of the section 115 issue and deductibility, see 
Governmental Information Letter, I.R.S. (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Government-Entities/
Federal,-State-&-Local-Governments/Governmental-Information-Letter.
49. I.R.C. § 4942(a), (d)–(e) (2012).
50. The expenditures must be used to support the charitable purposes listed in Code Section 
170(c)(2), which include educational purposes. I.R.C. § 4942(g) (2012).
51. I.R.C. § 4942(g) (2012). Private foundations typically accomplish this by transferring funds 
directly to charitable organizations that qualify as public charities under section 509(a).
52. I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4) (2012). This is typically referred to as expenditure responsibility. 
Failure to monitor expenditures can result in an excise tax starting at twenty percent 
of the expenditure. See Grants by Private Foundations: Expenditure Responsibility, I.R.S. 
(July 7, 2015) http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Private-Foundations/
Grants-by-Private-Foundations:-Expenditure-Responsibility.
53. A public charity is an organization that qualifi es as tax-exempt under Code Section 501(c)
(3) and either operates a favored type of public institution such as a church or a hospital, 
or receives a substantial amount of support from the public or the government. I.R.C. § 
509(a)(1) & (2) (2012). While it might be possible to use a university’s foundation (which 
in most cases actually qualifi es as a public charity) as a conduit for donations and grants, 
the university foundation is also likely unwilling to make grants to a for-profi t entity. While 
expenditure responsibility does not apply to a public charity, it needs to keep good records, 
just like a private foundation, to ensure that money sent to a for-profi t entity uses the grant 
for a charitable purpose. See, e.g., Compliance Guide for § 501(c)(3) Public Charities, 16, I.R.S. 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221pc.pdf. Thus, public charities are often hesitant to 
make grants to for profi t entities as well.
54. See, e.g., Basic Field Grant, LEG. SVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/grants-grantee-resources/our-
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Postgraduate legal training programs that want to seek grants from private 
foundations and the government are well-advised to form a charitable 
organization and qualify for public charity status.
In addition, many states and local governments off er benefi ts to 
organizations exempt from tax under Section 501(c)(3), such as exemptions 
from property and sales taxes.55 Status as a charity may also permit resident 
attorneys to participate in loan-forgiveness programs, which could act as a salary 
supplement.56 Under certain narrow circumstances, tax-exempt organizations 
may be able to also take advantage of private activity tax-exempt bonds,57 
which could provide a program a cheaper way to raise funds for its facilities.
Finally, tax-exempt status may send a signal to both clients and the local bar. 
Many potential clients distrust lawyers and assume that they are only out to line 
their own pockets. Tax-exempt status would make clear that a postgraduate 
legal training program is not driven by a profi t motive. The local bar may 
also feel less threatened if a program is tax-exempt.58 Admittedly, establishing 
the program as a nonprofi t corporation provides many of these same benefi ts. 
However, because most people expect nonprofi ts to be qualifi ed as charitable 
organizations by the IRS, some may be confused if the program does not 
obtain tax-exempt status.
Before turning to consider whether postgraduate legal training programs 
should be considered charitable organizations, it is worthwhile to consider 
whether one of the new hybrid entities, such as low-profi t limited liability 
companies, benefi t corporations, and fl exible purpose corporations, might 
be appropriate.59 After all, these programs operate like normal businesses 
grant-programs/basic-fi eld-grant (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (requiring its grant recipients to 
be nonprofi t organizations with legal aid services as a charitable purpose).
55. For some benefi ts provided by states, see Bazil Facchina, Evan Showell, & Jan E. Stone, 
Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofi t Organizations: A Catalog and Some Thoughts on Nonprofi t 
Policymaking, 28 U. S.F. L. REV. 85 (1993-1994).
56. See, e.g., Public Service Loan Forgiveness, FED. STUD. AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.
ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/charts/public-service (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) 
(describing federal loan-forgiveness programs for those engaged in public service). These 
programs often have a length-of-service requirement. Given that the typical postgraduate 
law fi rm would only allow a student to stay two to three years, the postgraduate law fi rm is 
likely only a partial answer to this loan-forgiveness question.
57. I.R.C. § 145 (2012). Admittedly, obtaining a bond for these organizations would present 
some substantial challenges.
58. Establishing the program as a tax-exempt entity could arguably give such programs an 
advantage vis-à-vis for-profi t fi rms, so care must be taken to ensure that the programs focus 
on their educational mission and on those who are currently locked out of the market.
59. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REV. 387 
(2014). The statutes authorizing such entities appear aimed at the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm, which constrains managers’ ability to consider benefi ts to other 
constituents in their decision-making. Presumably, though, an L3C that adopted the twelve 
requirements needed for an LLC to seek exemption described, infra, note 97, could qualify 
under those circumstances.
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in that they charge clients, but they are tempered by strong social policy 
objectives of training new lawyers and creating greater access to legal services. 
Unfortunately, hybrid entities will not provide the benefi ts of tax exemption. 
First, these organizations cannot generally qualify as tax-exempt charitable 
organizations.60 Nor will investments in such organizations by foundations 
automatically qualify as program-related investments that count toward their 
qualifi ed distribution requirement.61  Thus, hybrid entities would have no 
better chance of receiving grants from a private foundation than a for-profi t 
business. They also might not be able to access governmental grants. Second, 
even if the tax issues were resolved favorably, it is not clear that clients or the 
local bar would accept hybrid entities to the same degree they would accept 
a charitable tax-exempt organization. Profi ts from hybrids can be distributed, 
undercutting much of the messaging and assurances that nonprofi t and tax-
exempt status provides.
2.  Postgraduate Legal Training Programs Should Qualify for Tax
Exemption as a Theoretical Matter
Before delving into the current guidance, it helps to consider more 
generally whether postgraduate programs are the type of activity for which 
tax exemption should be allowed. Answering that question may aff ect how 
strictly or narrowly authorities should read existing authority, none of which is 
directly on point. The scholarly debate over why the government should aff ord 
some organizations tax-exempt status began in earnest with an article by Boris 
Bittker and George Rahdert, in which the authors argued that an exemption 
from income tax for donation-receiving organizations was warranted on the 
grounds that charitable organizations do not have income in the same sense 
as for-profi t fi rms.62  Funds must be used for charitable purposes and, if such 
expenditures are considered deductible, by defi nition expenses will equal 
income, leading to no net income for tax purposes.63
60. While some have pushed to extend tax-exempt status to hybrids, they lack many of the 
characteristics, such as the non-distribution constraint, that traditional tax-exempt entities 
possess, making it diffi  cult to determine whether and to what extent they serve the public 
good. For a discussion of the reasons that such organizations should not receive tax-exempt 
status, see Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 59, at 421-41.
61. Id. at 396.
62. Boris Bittker & George Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofi t Organizations from Federal Income 
Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).
63. For more recent analyses of whether income taxation of nonprofi t organizations is appropriate 
on income measurement grounds, see Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a 
Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283 (2011). See also Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk 
About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 115 (2013) (providing a related justifi cation, namely that 
under the shareholder theory of corporate law we have no justifi cation for taxing charitable 
organizations because they have no shareholders).
  William D. Andrews off ered a related justifi cation for the charitable contribution 
deduction, arguing that the individuals who contribute income to public benefi t 
organizations should get a deduction because they dedicated their funds to public rather 
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In response, Henry B. Hansmann argued that tax exemption should be 
viewed as a subsidy to organizations that produce public or quasi-public 
goods.64 Under this theory, producers of such goods will fail to produce 
at optimal levels because they are unable to capture all the benefi ts their 
activities produce.65 The government can overcome the free-rider problem 
and consequent market failure by using its taxing power to force everyone 
to contribute to the production of such goods. Alternatively, the government 
can subsidize public good production by aff ording tax exemption to private 
organizations and creating tax incentives for others to provide the necessary 
funds. 66 Although Hansmann’s argument was not focused on the charitable 
contribution deduction, the deduction can be seen as a device to direct 
additional funds to organizations producing public goods, either by lowering 
the cost of private giving or allowing taxpayers to designate where their tax 
dollars should go. 67
Although others have advanced other theories,68 we believe that Hansmann 
off ers the best justifi cation for tax exemption. Thus, we examine postgraduate 
legal training programs under his market failure theory. The IRS itself has 
adopted a market failure justifi cation in its guidance regarding public 
than private consumption. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 309, 360 (1972).
64. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofi t Organizations from Corporate Income 
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 58 (1981); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofi t Enterprise, 89 
YALE L.J. 835 (1980). In addition to pointing out the free-rider problems associated with 
public good production, Hansmann also noted that nonprofi t status, and in particular the 
non-distribution constraint, served an important signal in cases where the market cannot 
adequately monitor behavior.
65. A true public good is nonrival and non-excludable, meaning that the consumption by 
one person does not diminish the ability of others to consume, and the producer cannot 
exclude people from consuming it. True public goods are quite rare, but similar market 
failure problems arise with private goods that have positive externalities, often referred to as 
quasi-public goods. For ease of reference, we will use the term public goods to describe both 
public and quasi-public goods.
66. The latter option is especially appealing if one believes that the government is likely to 
fail to set public good production at the appropriate level. For a discussion of why the 
government might fail to set the right mix or level, see Adam Chodorow, Charity with Chinese 
Characteristics, 30 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2012).
67. These alternative visions of the charitable deduction can be seen in Paul R. McDaniel, 
Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. 
REV. 377 (1972).
68. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofi t Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990); Evelyn 
Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 
(1998); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: 
A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419 (1998); Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Tax 
Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997); Mark A. 
Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofi t Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of 
Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307 (1991)  For a discussion of those theories, see Chodorow, 
supra note 66.
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interest law fi rms, leading us to believe that such a theoretical basis should be 
persuasive to the IRS.69
We note that not every market failure deserves to be corrected through a 
public subsidy. For instance, there is likely a market failure associated with 
car repair. Car owners do not trust car mechanics because of an information 
asymmetry problem. However, we do not argue that the IRS should allow 
car mechanics to operate as tax-exempt charitable organizations. Rather, the 
extent to which the public, writ large, is aff ected by the failure must be taken 
into account. We are not able to identify the exact point at which public harm 
or public good rises to the level where subsidy is justifi ed, but we believe on-
the-job training and the provision of legal services to those who cannot aff ord 
them fall well within the traditional ambit of public benefi t to qualify.
We contend that two diff erent market failures warrant government subsidy 
for postgraduate legal training programs. The fi rst is the failure of law schools 
and legal employers to provide meaningful educational training opportunities 
to new lawyers. The second is the lack of aff ordable legal services for the 
vast majority of Americans, which causes a signifi cant number of people to 
forgo lawyers. Either alone warrants tax exemption and the subsidy it entails. 
Together, they make an even stronger case.
Education has traditionally been seen as a quasi-public good, benefi ting 
not only those who acquire it, but also society generally. Recognition of 
education’s status as a quasi-public good can be seen in the long history of 
public education in the United States,70 as well as in its prominent role in 
the creation of the charitable deduction nearly 100 years ago.71  Economic 
theory suggests that people will underinvest in education from a societal 
perspective because they will not be compensated for the value it provides to 
the community at large. This is precisely what we have seen.
Given the benefi ts that fl ow to lawyers, some may question whether legal 
education—as opposed to secondary or college education—is a public or 
private good. As a recent ABA report of the future of legal education noted, it 
has characteristics of both:
69. Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152; Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154 (reasoning that public interest 
law fi rms can be exempt where the market would not otherwise provide a particular service).
70. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 120 YEARS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: A STATISTICAL 
PORTRAIT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS (Thomas D. Snyder ed. 1993), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93442.pdf. Indeed, Thomas Jeff erson repeatedly argued that an 
educated populace was central to the country’s success. See, e.g., A Bill for the More General 
Diff usion of Knowledge, in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS: PUBLIC PAPERS 365 (Library of America 
1984) (“The most eff ectual means of preventing [the perversion of power into tyranny are] 
to illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large, and more especially to 
give them knowledge of those facts which history exhibits, that possessed thereby of the 
experience of other ages and countries, they may be enabled to know ambition under all its 
shapes, and prompt to exert their natural powers to defeat its purposes.”).
71. See 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Henry French Hollis) (indicating that a key 
reason for enacting the charitable deduction was a fear that wealthy individuals would not 
otherwise donate to institutions of higher education).
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On the one hand, the training of lawyers is a public good. Society has a deep 
interest in the competence of lawyers, in their availability to serve society and 
clients, and in their values. This concern refl ects the centrality of lawyers in 
the eff ective functioning of ordered society. Society also has a deep interest in 
the system that trains lawyers. This is because the system directly aff ects the 
competence, availability, and values of lawyers … . The fact that the training 
of lawyers is a public good is a reason there is much more concern today with 
problems in law schools and legal education than with problems in education 
in other disciplines, like business schools and business education.
But the training of lawyers is not only a public good. The training of 
lawyers is also a private good. Legal education provides those who pursue 
it with skills, knowledge, and credentials that will enable them to earn a 
livelihood . . . .72
The question isn’t whether lawyers benefi t from their training, but rather 
whether the market fails to produce the optimal level of training. That point 
seems unassailable, at least if one asks legal employers. Finally, we note that 
this objection is not unique to training lawyers; all education includes a 
component of private benefi t, and we support it regardless of whether the 
learner is young or old, rich or poor, engaged in highly practical or deeply 
theoretical work.
The second market failure is the lack of aff ordable, high-quality legal services 
for large numbers of Americans. As described above in Part II.B, up to sixty 
percent of legal needs for the middle class are going unmet.73 This aff ects not 
only those who cannot aff ord lawyers, but also society at large. Pro se litigants 
slow down the operation of the courts, people’s rights go unprotected, and 
parties enter into suboptimal deals. In a society like ours, where virtually every 
activity is touched by the law, the lack of legal resources can undermine the 
rule of law itself.74
Finally from a practical standpoint, we believe society has already 
made a favorable judgment regarding subsidizing a highly similar training 
arrangement. Postgraduate legal training looks a lot like postgraduate medical 
training, which we willingly subsidize. Despite two years of clinical training in 
medical school, newly graduated doctors must undertake a one-year internship 
and then a residency under the close supervision of experienced physicians 
with a mandate to train new doctors. Only after they have completed such 
programs are new doctors viewed as fully qualifi ed to practice on their own. 
In all, this postgraduate training typically takes three to fi ve years. As with the 
postgraduate legal training program described here, the new doctors are paid 
for their services, though below market rates, and hospitals charge clients for 
the services rendered.
72. ABA DRAFT REPORT, supra note 30, at 6.
73. Spieler, supra note 4, at 369-76.
74. Berenson, supra note 5.
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According to a recent report, the government contributes approximately 
$15 billion to subsidize postgraduate medical training through Medicare 
and Medicaid,75 in addition to funding other agencies, such as the National 
Institutes of Health and the Department of Veterans Aff airs and the states. 
This funding supports approximately 115,000 residents each year at a cost 
of about $100,000 per resident per year, or about $500,000 per each new 
physician. Millions of Americans otherwise unable to aff ord medical services 
benefi t from these subsidies, which can be justifi ed based on the positive 
externalities associated with a healthy populace.76
Medicine and law clearly diff er, and one could argue that the failure to train 
doctors adequately within the medical school setting is greater than the failure 
to train lawyers, because the consequences of a market failure in medicine are 
more signifi cant than in law. After all, a shortage of trained doctors could lead 
to loss of life, while the lack of trained lawyers typically has only monetary 
consequences. However, not all medical issues are life-threatening, and bad 
lawyering could lead to loss of liberty and even life in the criminal context. 
Lawyers help establish and protect individual rights, act as transaction cost 
engineers,77 and aid with the smooth functioning of the legal system. While 
private parties capture many of these benefi ts, society as a whole benefi ts when 
people are well-represented.
Moreover, the proposal regarding postgraduate legal education does not 
require direct investment. Nor is it likely to involve anywhere near the amount 
of government subsidy as is seen in medicine. Given the anticipated lack of 
profi ts at postgraduate legal training programs, the subsidy will likely be 
limited to the taxes that would have been paid on amounts donated to such 
organizations.
Given the positive externalities associated with legal education and the 
negative externalities that arise when people are not well-represented, we 
believe postgraduate legal training programs are worthy of a subsidy in the 
form of tax exemption and the ability to receive tax-deductible donations.
B.  Postgraduate Legal Training Programs Within the University Setting
A program operating within the university setting would either operate as 
an activity of the law school or as a separate legal entity owned by the law 
school or university, such as a single-member Limited Liability Company 
(LLC) or a controlled nonprofi t corporation. How such programs are treated 
75. Catherine Dower, Graduate Medical Education, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF, Aug. 16, 2012, at 1, http://
healthaff airs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_73.pdf.
76. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 1389 
(2015).
77. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value Creation for 
Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 (1995); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills 
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
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and the impact on the sponsoring law school depends on whether the law 
school is public or private and how the program is organized.
1.  Public Law Schools
State entities, including universities, generally do not need to qualify for 
tax exemption under section 501(c)(3). 78 Instead, they are exempt from federal 
income tax because of sovereign immunity or because the Code does not 
identify government entities as taxpayers. 79 If a postgraduate training program 
were operated without separate legal form, it would be considered an activity 
of the law school and would partake of the law school’s tax exemption and 
factor into decisions about whether exemption was appropriate in the fi rst 
place.
If the program is organized as a separate legal entity,80 perhaps to protect 
the school against liability, the path to exemption depends on the type of 
entity formed. One option would be to organize the program as a single-
member LLC, with the law school acting as the sole member. Single-member 
LLCs are generally ignored for tax purposes,81 and any activity carried out 
by such a program would simply be considered the activity of the school and 
automatically exempt, though potentially subject to UBIT.82
Alternatively, the law school could create a controlled nonprofi t corporation. 
Such entities might be granted tax-exempt status under a number of diff erent 
theories. First, the corporation could apply for 501(c)(3) status, discussed 
below in Part IV.C. Second, it could be considered exempt as an “integral 
part” of the law school or university. The IRS treats an organization as an 
integral part of a state or political subdivision when the state or political 
subdivision controls the organization’s operation without an independent 
78. See Ellen P. Aprill, Excluding the Income of State and Local Governments: The Need for Congressional Action, 
26 GA. L. REV. 421 (1992) (hereinafter Aprill, Excluding Income).
79. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 14,407 (Jan. 28, 1935). See Rev. Rul. 71-131, 1971-1 C.B. 28; Rev. 
Rul. 71-132, 1971-1 C.B. 29. See also Ellen P. Aprill, The Integral, the Essential, and the Instrumental: 
Federal Income Tax Treatment of Governmental Affi  liates, 23 J. CORP. L. 803 (1998) (hereinafter Aprill, 
Tax Treatment of Governmental Affi  liates). Most state schools are probably not considered the state 
or a political subdivision thereof because schools do not exercise one of the three sovereign 
powers of a state: (1) power to tax, (2) power of eminent domain, or (3) the police power. See 
Estate of Shamberg v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 131, (1944), aff ’d, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 
323 U.S. 792 (1945). Instead, they are probably considered an integral part of the state.
80. In some cases, this may not be possible. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST., art. IX, § 7 (banning state 
entities from owning stock in or otherwise owning companies).
81. Organizations typically treat single-member LLCs as partnerships for tax purposes. In such 
cases, LLCs are ignored for tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended 2014). 
However, members may elect to treat LLCs as corporations for tax purposes. In such cases, 
activities at the LLC would no longer be considered activities of the law school.
82. Contributions to LLCs wholly owned by a section 501(c)(3) parent are deductible as 
charitable contributions if the contributions meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 170. See I.R.S. 
Notice 2011-52, I.R.B. 2011-30 (June 25, 2011).
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organizational structure,83 though in some cases such structures are permitted.84 
Unfortunately, as Professor Aprill has noted,85 the IRS has been inconsistent 
in how it applies these rulings, and any school taking this path would probably 
need to seek a private letter ruling. While we believe that tax-exempt status 
should be allowed for the policy reasons noted above, it is not clear how the 
IRS would actually rule.
Third, a public school could attempt to fi t the program within Code Section 
115.86 Section 115 does not technically exempt the entity from taxation; instead, 
it excuses from tax any income derived from the exercise of an “essential 
governmental function” that accrues to a state or political subdivision.87 
Integral part and Code Section 115 are similar, but important diff erences exist. 
In particular, Code Section 115 requires less day-to-day control. The IRS tends 
to be quite lenient in construing both the “essential governmental function” 
and “accruing” elements,88 while courts have taken a more stringent view, 
leaving legal advice on the matter somewhat challenging. The primary reasons 
for seeking exclusion under either the integral part doctrine or Code Section 
115 over Code Section 501(c)(3) would be to eliminate the Form 990 fi ling 
requirement and escape general supervision by the IRS under provisions such 
as Code Section 4958 (excess benefi t transactions).
From a tax perspective, it would be much easier for a school to run the 
program as an activity or through an LLC. The other approaches make sense 
only if non-tax considerations precluded doing so. Regardless of the legal 
theory for exemption or how the program is organized, the primary tax-related 
83. See Rev. Rul. 60-384, 1960-2 C.B. 172; Rev. Rul. 87-2, 1987-1 C.B. 18. See also Aprill, Tax Treatment 
of Governmental Affi  liates, supra note 79, at 810.
84. Aprill, Tax Treatment of Governmental Affi  liates, supra note 79, at 810, citing to I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 97-33-003 (May 9, 1997); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-06-006 (Nov. 8, 1996); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 96-27-016 (Apr. 5, 1996); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-22-019 (Feb. 28, 1996). The IRS has 
suggested that, where the state is “substantially involved” in an organization’s activities, it can 
be considered an integral part. Joseph O’Malley, Elizabeth Mayer, & Marvin Friedlander, 
State Institutions—Instrumentalities, I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. TEXT, 1996, 
at 5, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicf96.pdf. The following factors are important 
in determining involvement: (1) creation of the organization by executive order of the 
governor of a state, (2) creation of the organization by executive order of the governor of a 
state as an offi  cial state agency, (3) a state or a state agency having the power to appoint and 
remove the organization’s board, (4) a state or a state agency having the power to abolish 
the organization, (5) a state or a state agency monitoring the organization’s activities, and 
(6) the organization using government employees to conduct its activities. Id.
85. See Aprill, Tax Treatment of Governmental Affi  liates, supra note 79.
86. Rev. Rul. 60-384, 1960-2 C.B. 172.
87. I.R.C. § 115 (2012). Under this provision, the program would be able to receive tax-
deductible donations and grant funding from private foundations, just like organizations 
granted tax-exempt status under Code Section 501(c)(3).
88. See Aprill, Excluding Income, supra note 78.
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danger for a public law school is whether any income the program generates 
would be subject to UBIT, which is discussed below in Part IV.C.4.89
2.  Private Law Schools
Unlike public law schools, private law schools typically obtain tax-
exempt status by qualifying as charitable organizations under Code Section 
501(c)(3). To qualify under that section, entities must be organized and 
operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes. Education is one of 
the approved exempt purposes.90 Having a substantial non-exempt purpose is 
fatal to an organization’s application or continuing exempt status, even if an 
organization has several exempt purposes.91 Thus, unlike with public schools, 
whose tax exemption is secure, a postgraduate training program operated 
within a private school could potentially put the school’s tax exemption at 
risk, in addition to raising UBIT questions.92
As before, a program operated without any separate legal structure or as 
a single-member LLC is simply considered a law school activity, 93 and the 
program would derive its tax exemption directly from the law school because 
it is the law school. As Professor Colombo has noted, it seems highly unlikely 
that a program’s activities would threaten a law school’s tax-exempt status.94 
To do so, the program would have to constitute a substantial non-exempt 
purpose. Assuming the program is designed with training lawyers as its 
primary goal, it seems unlikely that the program would be deemed a separate, 
non-exempt purpose. In contrast, a program designed to benefi t individuals, 
such as the supervising attorneys, could be deemed a non-exempt purpose. 
However, it seems unlikely that such a program would be deemed substantial 
given the relative size of most law schools, whether measured by revenue, 
89. Any law school considering operating a program within the law school that has issued 
tax-exempt bonds should also examine whether the operation of such a fi rm could cause 
problems for its tax-exempt bond status under Code Section 145.
90. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
91. See Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
92. C.f. Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974 (reviewing both exempt status and UBIT questions 
as a result of a joint venture conducted by a university).
93. The school could also consider entering into a joint venture with a for-profi t organization 
in the form of an LLC. The LLC would not obtain exemption, but its activity would be 
attributed to the law school. This could aff ect its exempt status if too much private benefi t 
accrues to the for-profi t partner, or create an obligation to pay UBIT on the venture’s 
income. The IRS has approved this structure under certain conditions. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 
1998-1 C.B. 718; Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974. Among the charity’s responsibilities must 
be the need to exercise control over matters that would aff ect the venture’s exempt purpose. 
See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718; Rev. Rul. 2004-51. We do not consider the joint-venture 
option further because we believe it presents unnecessary complications. For a thorough 
analysis of the issues raised by joint ventures of nonprofi t organizations, see MICHAEL I. 
SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 2007).
94. Colombo, Tax Exemption Aspects, supra note 46.
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assets, employees, or hours worked. For the postgraduate training program to 
endanger a law school’s tax exemption, the program would have to grow to a 
mammoth size, such that revenue from the sale of legal services exceeded that 
of the law school on a regular basis.95
More likely is that program profi ts could be subject to UBIT. Professor 
Colombo concludes that if the activity is conducted within the law school, 
it is highly likely that it would be considered substantially related to the 
law school’s exempt purpose and thus not an unrelated business activity. 
However, we caution that, if the program were conducted without suffi  cient 
regard to the educational mission, the activity could be deemed unrelated to 
the school’s educational mission. The prudent law school should adopt clear 
rules to ensure that the educational mission dominates, as discussed below in 
our recommendations in Part IV.C.4. Even if the IRS were to determine UBIT 
applied, the ruling would not have a signifi cant fi nancial impact because such 
programs are unlikely to turn a profi t and consequently should owe little if 
any tax.
C.  Stand-Alone Postgraduate Training Programs
1.  Qualify for 501(c)(3) Status Under Current Guidance
Qualifying a stand-alone program as a tax-exempt charity depends on the 
type of entity formed. One possibility is to create the program as a single-
member LLC owned by an existing tax-exempt organization, such as a 
freestanding alumni organization or university foundation. As noted above, 
the LLC would generally be disregarded for tax purposes, unless it elected 
to be taxed as a corporation. However, the affi  liation could pose a number of 
tax issues for the sponsoring organization. At the very least, the sponsoring 
organization would be required to notify the IRS on its Form 990, but it 
might also want to seek clarifi cation from the IRS on its status to ensure 
that the change did not threaten its exempt status.96 Multimember LLCs 
95. We discuss the legal standard and its application in greater detail in the context of stand-
alone programs, where the fee-for-service aspect of programs looms much larger.
96. Tax exemption letters from the IRS provide certainty regarding the activities disclosed to the 
IRS in the application. An organization that signifi cantly changes its activities must provide 
notice to the IRS on its Form 990. I.R.S., FORM 990 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f990.pdf. However, such notice does not provide the organization any assurance from 
the IRS that it remains in compliance with the exempt requirements. Before beginning to 
operate the program, the organization may want to seek a private letter ruling from the IRS 
to ensure that the new activity will not jeopardize its exempt status. See I.R.S., COMPLIANCE 
GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3) PUBLIC CHARITIES, PUB. 4221-PC at 23 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-pdf/p4221pc.pdf. The organization could also choose to have the LLC apply separately 
for exemption, but the LLC would no longer be disregarded, and we are back to our 
argument below in Part IV.C. See I.R.S., IRS INSTRUCTIONS FOR LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
REFERENCE SHEET 1-2, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/llc_guide_sheet_instructions.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (Part I, questions 1 & 2).
487
present signifi cant diffi  culties and may not be worth the eff ort. 97  This leaves 
nonprofi t corporations as the best choice if tax exemption is to be sought. 
Such organizations must qualify in their own right.
Postgraduate legal training programs that provide legal services to paying 
clients do not fi t easily within categories of legal service organizations for 
which tax exemption is readily available. Nonetheless, a path does exist that 
is consistent with both the letter and spirit of current guidance. We believe 
the path is narrow and will require constant vigilance on the part of those who 
direct such programs. However, programs that have education as their primary 
purpose and use appropriately scaled on-the-job training in a commercial 
setting to accomplish this purpose should qualify under both the general 
guidance on tax exemption and the specifi c guidance directed to charitable 
organizations that provide on-the-job training.
a.  False Starts
At fi rst blush, one might think that stand-alone postgraduate legal training 
programs could qualify as tax-exempt under Code Section 501(c)(3) as a 
qualifi ed legal services organization or by virtue of the low-cost services they 
provide to those who cannot aff ord lawyers.98 If nothing else such programs 
seem quite similar to medical residency programs, and one might think that 
the rationale in the former context would work in the latter. Unfortunately, 
none of these approaches provides a clear path to exemption.
First, most programs would not qualify as public interest law fi rms. The 
IRS has defi ned public interest work to be the type of work that for-profi t 
fi rms will not take, typically because the private interests are insuffi  cient to 
warrant hiring a lawyer. 99 It has also generally limited public interest fi rms from 
receiving more than fi fty percent of their support from fees charged to clients. 100 
97. See note 93, supra. The Service allows LLCs to qualify as charitable organizations where they 
meet a twelve-part test including that its only members are other charitable organizations or 
government entities. See Richard A. McCray & Ward L. Thomas, Limited Liability Companies as 
Exempt Organizations—An Update,  I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. TEXT, 2001, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb01.pdf.
98. IRS guidance clearly creates a path for four diff erent types of legal services organizations: 
(1) legal aid organizations providing assistance to low-income individuals free or for a small 
fee, (2) human and civil rights defense organizations, (3) public interest law fi rms, and (4) 
organizations that attempt to achieve charitable goals through litigation itself. See Litigation by 
501(c)(3) Organizations, I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. TEXT, 1984. Programs 
are not likely to fi t under the second and fourth categories.
99. The IRS explained in Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152; Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154, that 
private interests suffi  cient to warrant hiring an attorney suggest that no public interest 
exists. More recently, the IRS has permitted public interest fi rms to charge fees, subject 
to limitations, Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4.05, 1992-2 C.B. 411, suggesting a broader view of public 
interest. However, such fi rms must set their policies and programs through a committee 
representative of the public interest.
100. Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4.05, 1992-2 C.B. 411. Initially fi rms were barred from seeking or accepting 
attorneys’ fees from clients, Rev. Proc. 75-13 § 3.01, 1975-1 C.B. 662, but they were allowed to 
accept fees paid by the opposing side or awarded by courts. Id. § 3.02. However, they could 
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By design, most postgraduate training programs will seek to represent a mix of 
low-income and middle-income parties in private disputes, making it unlikely 
that the work done would count as public interest. In addition, most programs 
will depend primarily on fees for support, violating the fi fty percent limit.101
Second, it seems unlikely that most programs will qualify as legal aid 
organizations. Organizations that provide legal services to the indigent free or 
at a nominal fee can qualify for tax exemption,102 and some programs may have 
received tax-exempt status under this rule.103 However, the IRS has also held 
that providing below-market goods or services to those simply unable to pay 
market rates is not a charitable purpose under Code Section 501(c)(3) and could 
indeed defeat tax exemption.104 In other contexts, the IRS has suggested that, 
where a service is not “inherently charitable,” the service must be provided at 
“substantially below cost” to obtain exemption.105 Organizations that provide 
services to those beyond the poor or near-poor or that must survive on the 
fees they charge clients seem unlikely to qualify.106 It is possible that the IRS 
not consider the likelihood of fee recovery in their decision whether to take a particular 
case. Id. § 3.03. See also Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154 (ruling that a fee award cannot be a 
substantial motivating factor in the decision to take a case). The IRS liberalized the rules in 
1992 and now permits fi rms to charge their clients. However, they cannot charge more than 
their actual costs. Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 5.01. Nor may they withdraw from a case if the client 
cannot pay. Id. § 5.02.
101. The fi fty percent rule formally applies only to public interest law fi rms, and if the IRS 
wished to promote low-bono fi rms it could create a diff erent rule for such fi rms and expand 
on the notion of what constitutes a legal aid organization. 
102. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-2 C.B. 177 (advising that legal organization that represents indigents 
and charges fees based upon each indigent’s ability to pay is operated for a charitable 
purpose). See also, Rev. Rul. 72-559, 1972-2 C.B. 247 (advising that providing subsidies to 
recent law graduates to establish practices in economically depressed communities does not 
jeopardize tax-exempt status).
103. Such organizations likely received private letter rulings from the IRS, which are applicable 
only to their particular facts and circumstances and have no precedential value.
104. Rev. Rul. 73-127, 1973-1 C.B. 221 (fi nding that the sale of groceries to the poor at below-
market prices was not an exempt purpose); Fed’n Pharm. Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 67 
(1979), aff ’d, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980) (fi nding that a pharmacy that sold drugs at cost to 
the elderly and the handicapped did not qualify for exemption).
105. See IRC 501(c)(3)—Substantially Below Cost, I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. 
TEXT, 1986, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich86.pdf (indicating that fi fteen percent 
of cost qualifi es as substantially below cost); Rev. Rul. 71-529, 1971-2 C.B. 234.
106. We note that in both the medical and educational contexts, charitable organizations 
provide services at market rates to all comers, suggesting that there should be room for 
other types of organizations to do so without risking their tax-exempt status. Indeed, in the 
housing context, the IRS has allowed the sale of services or goods to the poor and middle 
class combined, so long as substantially all of those receiving the housing are low-income 
individuals. Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115; Rev. Proc. 96-32, 1996-1 C.B. 717 (providing 
safe harbor for low-income housing assistance organizations set up to assist low- and 
moderate-income residents if seventy-fi ve percent of the units are occupied by families who 
are low-income (meaning eighty percent of the median local income)). Compare, however, 
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has changed the norm for legal assistance organizations. However, it is not 
apparent from the published guidance.
Whether providing low-bono services alone should qualify as an exempt 
purpose is beyond the scope of this Article. However, if the IRS is taking 
a broad view of what qualifi es as a legal aid organization, it should publish 
guidance that clearly sets forth the requirements for qualifying as a legal aid 
organization, thereby clearing up any uncertainty or confusion.
Finally, the rationale covering nonprofi t hospitals and medical residency 
programs is not a clean fi t because it is based on the provision of medical 
services. Much like legal training programs, medical residency programs train 
recent graduates, whom they pay, while providing services to a wide range of 
patients and charging market rates for the services they provide. However, 
the justifi cation for exempting medical resident programs does not appear 
primarily to be the educational function served. Instead, the provision 
of medical services is charitable because operated for the benefi t of the 
community.107 As the IRS recognized in Revenue Ruling 69-545, promoting 
health for the benefi t of the community has long been recognized a charitable 
purpose even when not necessarily strictly directed toward the interests of the 
poor. Whether right or not, providing legal assistance is simply not seen as an 
inherently charitable activity, and a training program for such an operation 
must take a diff erent path to exemption. 108
Rev. Rul. 2006-27, 2006-1 C.B. 915, in which the IRS appears concerned about whether 
signifi cant private benefi t is involved in these types of transactions.
107. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (fi nding that a nonprofi t hospital qualifi es for exemption 
where it operates for the benefi t of the community by (1) maintaining a community board, (2) 
providing services to all in the community who can pay, and (3) operating an emergency room 
open to all, including those who cannot pay). The primary distinction between a for-profi t 
and a nonprofi t tax-exempt hospital for some time has been the non-distribution constraint 
imposed on tax-exempt hospitals. Although Rev. Rul. 69-545 noted that an emergency room 
open to all was an important factor in justifying the exemption, the Emergency Medical 
and Labor Treatment Act of 1986 (Section 1867(a) of the Social Security Act) imposed that 
obligation on all hospitals. The Patient Protection and Aff ordable Care Act imposed new 
rules on tax-exempt hospitals that provide a bit more distinction between these two types of 
organizations. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Section 501(r) requires tax-exempt 
hospitals to perform a community health needs assessment, adopt fi nancial assistance, new 
billing, and collection policies, and limit charges to patients. I.R.C. § 501(r) (2012).
108. The closest analogue within the medical context for postgraduate legal training programs 
is faculty group practice organizations. See Hugh K. Webster, Tax-Exempt Organizations: 
Operational Requirements, 451-1st, TAX MGMT PORTFOLIOS—EST., GIFTS & TR. SERIES (BNA) 
(2015). These are groups of medical school faculty employed in part by a hospital or higher 
education institution, but incorporated pursuant to a state law as a group of doctors engaged 
in private practice. The practice bills patients and pays the doctors an amount in addition 
to any base salary from the university or hospital. The doctors typically teach and train 
medical residents as part of their private practice. The IRS originally refused to grant these 
practice groups exemption because they believed the doctors received too much private 
benefi t; but the IRS lost a series of cases in the 1980s, and it now generally recognizes such 
practices as exempt as long as they follow fairly strict guidelines. Univ. Mass. Med. Sch. 
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b.  Education With On-The-Job Training as the Path to Exemption
Despite the false starts described above, current guidance off ers two paths 
to tax exemption for postgraduate legal training programs. One possibility 
is that law school-affi  liated programs could be granted exemption because 
they advance the mission of their affi  liated schools. The other is that such 
programs advance education in their own right, even if they don’t look like 
traditional educational institutions. This latter approach paves the way for 
non-law school-affi  liated programs.
i.  Indirect Exemption
The IRS has held that organizations that provide commercially available 
services can receive tax exemption if they advance the interests of an exempt 
educational institution.109 For instance, the IRS has granted tax exemption 
to college bookstores,110 dorms,111 cafeterias, and restaurants,112 as well as to 
providers of scholarships and low-interest loans to college students.113 It has 
also found that a separately incorporated non-university-controlled alumni 
association that raises funds for university programs, engages in public 
relations work on behalf of the university, publishes an alumni magazine, and 
supervises the sale of football tickets allotted to alumni is exempt from tax 
because substantially all of its activities aid education.114
Relatedly, the IRS has suggested that exempt organizations can create 
separate entities over which they have substantial control and seek exemption 
Grp. Practice v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1299 (1980), acq., 1980-2 C.B. 2; B.H.W. Anesthesia Found., 
Inc. v. Comm’r., 72 T.C. 681 (1979), nonacq., 1980-2 C.B. 2. The rationale for granting these 
programs tax-exempt status seems to be that they are an integral part of the exempt entity 
they are associated with and that they promote health. While not directly on point, these 
authorities suggest that commercial activities can be affi  liated with charitable organizations, 
where the commercial activity is closely associated with the teaching mission.
109. These rulings seem closely connected to the integral part doctrine discussed above in Part 
IV.B. For a discussion of this theory, see Roderick Darling & Marvin Friedlander, Virtual 
Mergers Hospital Joint Operating Agreement Affi  liations, I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L 
EDUC. TEXT, 1997, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicj97.pdf. However, the rulings 
and holdings do seem to stand on their own, supporting the idea of an independent ground 
for allowing exemption.
110. Squire v. Students Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951).
111. Rev. Rul. 76-336, 1976-2 C.B. 143 (fi nding that nonprofi t corporation that provides housing to 
students at college advances education and thus is operated for a charitable purpose under 
§ 501(c)(3) where (1) neither the community nor the college is able to provide adequate 
housing, (2) the organization consults with the college, and (3) the corporation locates the 
housing near the college).
112. Rev. Rul. 58-194, 1958-1 C.B. 240 (fi nding that a corporation “organized for the purpose of 
operating a book and supply store and a cafeteria and restaurant on the campus of a State 
university primarily for the convenience of its student body and the members of its faculty 
. . . operated exclusively for educational purposes.”).
113. Rev. Rul. 63-220, 1963-2 C.B. 208.
114. Rev. Rul. 60-143, 1960-1 C.B. 192.
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under the integral part theory, which is similar to that discussed above in the 
context of public schools.115 In a non-precedential statement, the IRS stated 
that an existing exempt organization must exercise “suffi  cient control and 
close supervision . . . to establish the equivalent of a parent and subsidiary 
relationship,” and that the organization seeking exemption “must perform 
essential services that if performed by the exempt organization itself would 
not be an unrelated trade or business.”116
None of the cases cited above involves an organization similar to the 
postgraduate legal training program described here. Nonetheless, postgraduate 
legal training programs will support their affi  liated law schools and advance 
their goal of producing well-trained lawyers. Such activities would not likely 
be viewed as unrelated if carried on within the schools. Accordingly, despite 
commercial overtones, the IRS could use this line of authority to grant tax 
exemption to a postgraduate training program closely affi  liated and supervised 
by a related law school.
ii.  Direct Exemption
The more direct approach focuses on the educational eff orts of the programs 
themselves. A properly designed program should qualify under the general 
guidance for Code Section 501(c)(3) and the specifi c guidance addressing 
charitable organizations that provide on-the-job training. The key to this 
approach is to ensure that any commercial activity is clearly “in furtherance of” 
the programs’ educational purpose and is properly scaled to that purpose. We 
start with the general rules before moving on to the more specifi c guidance.
a.  General Guidance
Code Section 501(c)(3) aff ords tax exemption to organizations that pursue 
educational purposes. Educational purposes include “[t]he instruction 
or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing 
his capabilities . . . .”117 Code Section 501(c)(3) also permits exemption for 
organizations that pursue charitable purposes. Advancement of education is 
included as a charitable purpose and therefore serves as a separate ground for 
exemption.118 Even though postgraduate training programs are not traditional 
schools, for which exemption is readily available,119 they clearly pursue 
115. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-41, 1978-1 C.B. 148 (fi nding that a malpractice trust “serving as a 
repository for funds paid in by the hospital, and by making payments at the direction of the 
hospital” operates as an integral part of the hospital and is therefore tax-exempt under Code 
Section 501(c)(3)).
116. Darling & Friedlander, supra note 109. 
117. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iv)(2) (as amended 2008).
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d).
119. Schools typically maintain a regular faculty and have a curriculum and a regularly enrolled 
student body. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(A)(ii) (2012). They also typically charge tuition and award 
degrees. The examples provided in the Treasury regulations include “a primary or secondary 
school, a college, or a professional or trade school.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii). 
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educational purposes and advance education.120 The question will be whether 
the commercial activity through which the on-the-job training is accomplished 
will somehow defeat exemption.
To qualify for charitable status, an organization must be organized and 
operated “exclusively” for charitable purposes.121 However, in construing the 
operational side of that test, the regulations interpret the term “exclusively” 
to require only that the organization be operated “primarily” for an exempt 
purpose.122 Under this standard, organizations are ineligible for tax-exempt 
status if a “more than insubstantial portion” of their activities is in pursuit of 
a non-exempt purpose.123
Selling goods and services to paying customers, even at a discount, is not 
an exempt purpose, and therefore otherwise charitable organizations typically 
cannot be exempt if those activities are substantial. In such cases, the IRS will 
deny an organization exempt status because the organization has a “substantial 
commercial purpose.” 124 Two bits of related law and guidance complicate 
To be clear, not all educational institutions are granted tax exemption. Organizations 
that violate public policy are not entitled to tax-exempt status. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Moreover, where a school serves a private as opposed to 
a public interest, tax exemption is not permitted. Thus, if McDonald’s created McDonald’s 
U to train new employees, tax exemption would be inappropriate. John D. Colombo, Why 
Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (and Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 35 
ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 847 (1993).
120. Although not precisely on point, the IRS has found that an organization providing funds 
for an on-the-job legal learning experience “advances education by supporting the training 
of individuals for the purpose of improving or developing their abilities.” Rev. Rul. 78-310, 
1978-2 C.B. 173. This ruling supports a broad reading of educational purpose that should 
encompass providing training directly. Also, the IRS has approved an apprenticeship 
program established as a joint project of labor and management. Rev. Rul. 67-72, 1967-1 C.B. 
125; see also Rev. Rul. 72-101, 1972-1 C.B. 144 (approving the establishment of a school by labor 
and management to train employees).
121. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c).
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). This interpretation likely comes from the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation in Better Bus. Bureau v. U.S., 326 U.S. 279 (1945), of a related statute found in the 
Social Security Act. See Philip Hackney, A Response to Professor Leff ’s Tax Planning “Olive Branch” for 
Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. (2014).
124. See, e.g., Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1991) (affi  rming U.S. Tax Court 
decision that Living Faith’s activities operating a health food restaurant demonstrated a 
“substantial commercial purpose” such that it did not qualify for tax exemption). See 
also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 51-52 (2005). See also Goldsboro Art League v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 337, 338 (1980), in 
which the IRS informed the taxpayer, which ran a museum and provided art education in 
the community and also sold some of the art: “You are not operated for any exempt purpose 
within the meaning of Sections 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2). You are operated in furtherance of 
a substantial commercial purpose. Further you serve private rather than public interests.” 
The court reversed the IRS because it found that the organization operated primarily for 
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the analysis. First, the regulations create an exception if the commercial 
activities are “in furtherance of” an organization’s exempt purpose. However, 
the organization cannot be organized primarily to carry on such activities.125 
Second, in 1950, Congress enacted the UBIT, which imposes a tax on a 
charitable organization’s unrelated business income. This implicitly allows 
organizations to carry on some quantum of an unrelated trade or business and 
to engage in any amount of a related trade or business, so long as it does not 
become a primary purpose.
To determine whether postgraduate training programs with signifi cant on-
the-job training aspects qualify for exempt status, we must fi rst understand 
what “in furtherance of” means. One possibility, and one that would give the 
law coherence, is that the “in furtherance” requirement has the same defi nition 
as used in the UBIT context, that is, the activity must bear “causal relationship” 
and “contribute importantly” to the organization’s exempt purpose.126
Another possible interpretation of “in furtherance of” is that the activity will 
be deemed in furtherance of exempt purposes if it generates revenues that are 
used to support such purposes.127 This is often referred to as the “destination 
of income” test, and the inquiry focuses on whether the charitable support 
from an otherwise unrelated business activity is commensurate with the 
business activity. 128 We believe that Congress makes clear via the UBIT and 
Code Section 502 that operating a business to generate revenue to support a 
charitable cause cannot be considered “in furtherance of” an exempt purpose. 
However, we off er it here for completeness.
We must also determine when a business activity will be deemed an 
organization’s “primary” purpose. Authorities have denied exemption where 
business interests dominate, by what is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of 
“commerciality.” For instance, a company organized to improve the quality of 
Sunday school texts, but which had expanded its off erings and accumulated 
educational purposes. Id. at 345. The sale of paintings did not rise to the level of primary 
purpose. Id. at 342. The regulations do not describe what constitutes primary or substantial, 
which creates some uncertainty and puts signifi cant pressure on the exceptions. Id. at 346. 
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (as amended 2008). As the Tax Court noted in Goldsboro, 75 
T.C. at 343, “[a]n organization may engage in a trade or business as long as its operation 
furthers an exempt purpose and its primary objective is not the production of profi ts.”
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended 1983).
127. The Supreme Court set this standard in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). See also, 
Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186 (granting exempt status to organization that operated a 
commercial real estate rental business to fund charitable activities).
128. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-182 (granting exempt status to an organization that operated a 
commercial real estate rental business to fund charitable activities). Under this theory, 
a business that generates signifi cant revenues, only a small portion of which are used to 
support charity, will not be deemed in furtherance of charitable purposes. See, e.g., I.R.S. 
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,682 (Nov. 17, 1971). Similarly, where a business fails to produce 
signifi cant revenues to support charity, it will be deemed not to be in furtherance of charity, 
thus thwarting tax exemption. See, e.g., id. at 23-24. 
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over $1.6 million in net earnings from the sale of books, lost its exemption 
because the authorities found that its primary purpose became the sale of 
books rather than the advancement of education or religion. 129 In other words, 
if the organization looks more like a commercial enterprise than a charity, 
and especially if the activity is loosely related to the exempt purpose, the 
organization will be deemed to be primarily engaged in commercial activity, 
thus precluding exemption. 130
Finally, there is the issue of “private benefi t.”131 Organizations that benefi t 
private as opposed to public interests are typically denied exemption. For 
instance, in Ginsberg v. Commissioner, the Tax Court found an organization 
that dredged a private waterway for the sole benefi t of the donors to the 
organization provided so much private benefi t that the organization was 
not operated primarily for an exempt purpose.132 More recently, the Tax 
Court found the American Campaign Academy, which trained individuals 
or candidates who intended to advocate only for Republicans, was not 
primarily operated for an exempt purpose. 133 Courts and the IRS recognize 
that all nonprofi t organizations benefi t some private interests. The question is 
whether the organization is operating more than “incidentally for the purpose 
of benefi ting the private interests.”134
129. See, e.g., Scripture Press Found. v. U.S., 285 F.2d 800, 805 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
985 (1962) (fi nding based on evidence of signifi cant growth of sales that the “sale of religious 
literature is its primary activity and that its instructional phase is incidental thereto.”). But 
see Presbyterian & Reformed Publ’g Co. v. Comm’r, 743 F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1984) (upholding 
the exempt status of the Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. in a seemingly similar 
situation).
130. See, e.g., B.S.W. Grp. Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352 (1978) (fi nding that a purportedly 
nonprofi t consulting group looked too much like a for-profi t consulting group to qualify as 
tax-exempt).
131. The basis for this requirement appears to be Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended 
2008). Private benefi t is similar to private inurement and often confused with it. Private 
inurement occurs where net earnings of an organization inure to a private shareholder or 
individual. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). Private benefi t is a broader concept that focuses on 
the benefi ciaries of the organization’s activities. Examples of private inurement include 
excessive salaries. Private inurement should not pose a problem for postgraduate training 
programs. For a discussion of private benefi t, see John D. Colombo, Private Benefi t: What 
Is It—and What Do We Want It To Be?, NAT’L CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY & THE LAW ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (2011), http://www1.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/resources/documents/
JohnColomboFormattedNCPLPaper2011.pdf; Andrew Megosh, Mary Scollick, Mary Jo 
Salins, & Cheryl Chasin, Private Benefi t Under IRC 501(c)(3), I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING 
PROF’L EDUC. TEXT, 2001, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich01.pdf.
132. 46 T.C. 47 (1966).
133. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
134. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718. See, e.g., Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 377 
(1980) (fi nding that, even though the organization in question sold paintings and remitted 
eighty percent of the sale proceeds to the artists, the organization served a public purpose by 
primarily promoting art education and only incidentally served the artists’ private interests). 
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Under these standards, postgraduate training programs should be granted 
exemption if properly designed. Certainly, the classroom and practical 
training aspects of stand-alone programs support a claim that their purpose 
is educational. The questions are (1) whether providing legal services to 
paying clients is “in furtherance of” the exempt educational purpose, (2) if 
not, whether it is a substantial non-exempt purpose, (3) whether it rises to the 
level of  “primary” purpose, and (4) whether it creates a private as opposed to 
public benefi t.
As noted above, there are two possible ways to construe “in furtherance 
of.” The fi rst uses a defi nition similar to that used for UBIT, namely that the 
business activity must bear a “substantial relationship” to the organization’s 
exempt purpose.135 The program’s exempt purpose is to train new lawyers. 
Providing legal services to fee-paying clients will contribute to this goal 
because it is the best way for new lawyers to gain the experiences necessary 
to develop their practice skills. Providing legal services is a necessary means, 
not an independent end, 136 and therefore should be viewed as in furtherance 
of that goal.
Postgraduate legal training programs would face greater diffi  culty under 
the destination of income test because they are not designed to generate 
income. The IRS has ruled that an organization will fail this test if (1) the 
business activity does not generate funds to be used for exempt purposes, 
or (2) it generates signifi cant income, but only a small amount is used for 
charitable purposes.137 Ironically, under this standard, a program focused on 
making money would be more likely to be considered “in furtherance of” an 
exempt purpose than one designed to provide training. We think this would 
be an odd reading of the statute, especially in a case like this one, where the 
business activity is so clearly linked to the exempt purpose. 
If providing legal services to paying customers is deemed in furtherance of 
the exempt purpose, as we believe it should be, the activity should not be seen 
to be a primary purpose. If it is deemed not to further a program’s exempt 
purpose, in most cases the activity will be large enough to be considered a 
substantial non-exempt purpose, thus thwarting tax exemption.
Finally, postgraduate legal training programs do not appear to pose 
signifi cant private benefi t issues. The programs will not be preparing 
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended 1983).
136. This contrasts sharply with cases where the IRS and courts have rejected claims that 
commercial activity was in furtherance of an exempt activity. See, e.g., Senior Citizen Stores, 
Inc. v. U.S., 602 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1979). In Senior Citizen Stores, the taxpayer operated a number 
of secondhand stores and argued that they served the charitable purpose of aiding the 
elderly. The court held that the retail activity appeared to be an end in and of itself and not 
a means of accomplishing the charitable goal of assisting the elderly. Id. at 711. In particular, 
the court noted that “less than half [the organization’s] employees were over the age of 55, 
and their training was restricted to the needs of plaintiff ’s business. Plaintiff  conducted no 
training program beyond the training of employees for its own shops.” Id. at 713-14.
137. See supra note 128.
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new attorneys for a specifi c fi rm, as would be the case of the hypothetical 
McDonald’s University, or the American Campaign Academy.138 The IRS 
could assert that a given program is operated for the private benefi t of the 
supervising attorneys members, as it did in the faculty medical practice group 
context.139 To avoid this problem, care should be taken not to compensate 
attorneys based upon the return from the cases they bring in. The IRS could 
also assert that the programs operate for the benefi t of the clients. However, 
on-the-job training cannot proceed without clients, and this would doom all 
such enterprises.
b.  Specific Guidance—On-The-Job Training Programs
Postgraduate training programs need not rely on the general legal rules to 
support the claim that they deserve tax exemption. A number of authorities 
hold that organizations with on-the-job training in commercial settings 
can qualify for tax-exempt status so long as the training is in service, and 
appropriately scaled, to an exempt purpose. For instance, in Rev. Rul. 73-128, 
the IRS approved tax-exempt status for an organization that operated a toy-
making business as a vehicle to train unskilled persons who were unable to 
fi nd good jobs.140 The organization at issue operated a number of community 
programs, including remedial reading and language skills classes, general 
counseling services, and a job-training program. Participants in the training 
program were paid to make toys, which were sold to the public via regular 
commercial channels. Some participants worked in management roles. The 
positions were not permanent. Rather, the goal was to place them in permanent 
jobs as soon as they were adequately trained. Income earned through the sale 
of the toys was used to fund other community services, and any shortfalls were 
covered by public contributions.
The IRS noted that the sale of products is not a charitable purpose, whereas 
the provision of vocational training to the unskilled and underemployed was, 
so long as the manner of doing so was otherwise charitable. The question 
was whether the business operation was an end in and of itself or instead the 
means by which the organization accomplished its charitable purpose. The 
IRS concluded that the toy-making operation was a means to a charitable 
end based on the clear and distinct causal relationship between the activity 
and the training objective. Moreover, the scale of the toy-making activity was 
appropriate to the level of training being provided.
In contrast, Rev. Rul. 73-127 involved an organization that operated a 
grocery store and spent only four percent of its revenues on training the “hard-
core unemployed.” The rest of its operations were aimed at selling food at a 
discounted price to the poor. The IRS found that selling discounted food 
to the poor was not a charitable purpose, while helping the unemployed 
138. Supra note 133.
139. See supra note 108.
140. Rev. Rul. 73-128, 1973-1 C.B. 222.
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was. It also found that on-the-job training in commercial enterprises was 
an appropriate way to fulfi ll that purpose. However, because the grocery 
operation was substantially larger than necessary to carry out its charitable 
training mission, the IRS denied the organization tax-exempt status, fi nding 
that selling discounted groceries was a substantial non-exempt purpose.
Organizations that mix a charitable purpose with on-the-job training in 
commercial settings are becoming increasingly popular. For instance, Juma 
Ventures in San Francisco is dedicated to helping at-risk youth. It used to 
operate a number of Ben & Jerry’s franchises, which it used to train its clientele 
in basic skills such as counting change, getting to work on time, etc., so that 
they can move on to jobs at for-profi t organizations.141 It now has relationships 
with sports stadiums to do similar work.142 The Delancey Street Foundation in 
San Francisco is dedicated to helping the homeless. It operates a restaurant 
that it uses to train its clientele in the hopes that they will be able to fi nd 
work elsewhere.143 A number of partnerships between charities and for-profi t 
businesses have also sprung up to create training opportunities for the 
disadvantaged. 144
We believe that a well-designed postgraduate legal training program 
fi ts within these authorities and examples. The fee-for-service aspect of the 
program is specifi cally designed to train the resident attorneys in the skills 
they will need. It will also be scaled to the educational purpose. If the program 
is properly designed, resident attorneys will work on every matter handled. 
Every senior attorney in the program will supervise resident attorneys. Thus, 
such programs should fi t easily within Rev. Rul. 73-128 and avoid the pitfall 
described in Rev. Rul. 73-127 and in Senior Services, Inc.145
Some may believe that a training program for lawyers can be distinguished 
from those described in the precedents based on diff erences in the capabilities 
and salaries of lawyers, compared to those in the precedents. In particular, 
the exempt purposes served by the on-the-job training programs discussed in 
the guidance involve helping the poor. However, nothing in the precedents 
suggests that on-the-job training is appropriate only when helping the poor. 
Rather, they focus on the relationship between the training and the exempt 
141. For more information about Juma Ventures, see JUMA, http://www.juma.org (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2015).
142. See Juma Ventures Announces New Job Creation Program in New Orleans, SOC. ENTER.
ALL., (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.se-alliance.org/member-news/juma-ventures-announces-
new-job-creation-program-in-new-orleans.
143. For more information about the Delancey Street Foundation, see Welcome to Our Delancey Street 
Website, DELANCEY ST. FOUND., http://www.delanceystreetfoundation.org/ (last visited Nov. 
23, 2015).
144. See Susannah Camic Tahk, Crossing the Tax Code’s For-Profi t/Nonprofi t Border, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 
489 (2014) (describing a number of partnerships between for-profi t companies and public 
charities).
145. See supra note 136.
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purpose.146 Organizations that train lawyers in practical skills, including law 
schools and continuing legal education providers, can be tax-exempt because 
of their educational purpose.147 It would be a strange rule that prohibited all 
on-the-job training in an educational context. We believe that same principle 
should hold here.
Before moving on to the UBIT analysis, we make one more point about the 
clientele the program will serve. Were the program’s exempt purpose to serve 
the poor, the fact that some clients will not be poor could be problematic. 
However, where the sale of services or goods is properly tailored to accomplish 
an exempt purpose, the IRS is willing to allow those services to be provided to 
the middle class, even at market rates. The most obvious examples are hospitals 
and educational institutions, but the IRS has accepted this possibility outside 
of those two narrow fi elds. This was certainly the case in Rev. Rul. 73-128, 
discussed above.
In Rev. Rul. 72-124, the IRS held that an organization that provided homes 
for the elderly could be exempt even where the majority of those receiving 
services can pay for the services.148 Similarly, the IRS has granted exemption to 
an organization that provided loans to business owners in high-density urban 
areas with signifi cant poverty and neighborhood blight in order to stimulate 
economic development.149 The IRS noted that although some of the recipients 
of the loans would not be members of a charitable class, the important thing 
was that these individuals were “merely the instruments by which the charitable 
purposes are sought to be accomplished.”
In the case of a postgraduate training program, serving the middle class is 
actually important to the exempt mission. Training new attorneys to advise 
businesses requires clients with businesses, which the poor by and large do 
not own or operate. Nor are they likely to have the resources to retain lawyers 
to perform this type of work, even at the reduced rates such programs will 
charge. Expanding the client base beyond the poor is critical to the training 
mission of producing practice-ready lawyers and can provide broad societal 
benefi ts, given the market’s failure to produce aff ordable legal services.
2.  UBIT
Assuming a program is granted tax exemption, the question arises whether 
any income produced by on-the-job training can be considered “unrelated” to 
the charitable mission, such that it will be subject to UBIT. As noted above, 
the question of UBIT is important to whether the program is conducted 
146. A number of revenue rulings have held that apprenticeship programs, which typically 
involve work for clients, can be tax-exempt. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-272, 1877-2 C.B. 1919; Rev. 
Rul. 67-72, 1967-1 C.B. 125.
147. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, http://www.nita.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
148. Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 I.R.B. 145 (1972). See also, Rev. Rul. 79-18, 1979-1 C.B. 194 (1979).
149. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162 (1974).
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within law schools or outside, and whether the law school is public150 or 
private. To qualify as an unrelated trade or business, an activity must meet 
three requirements: (1) it must be a trade or business, (2) regularly carried on, 
and (3) not substantially related to the organization’s exempt purpose.151 The 
fi rst two requirements are not in question for postgraduate training programs, 
leaving only the question of whether the activity is substantially related to the 
program’s educational purpose.
While an organization’s tax exemption is not in question for this analysis, 
an organization that engages primarily in substantially unrelated activities 
will not qualify as a tax-exempt organization.152 The regulations under Code 
Section 513 provide important guidance here, stating that “the size and extent 
of the activities involved must be considered in relation to the nature and 
extent of the exempt function which they purport to serve.”153 One example in 
the regulations is quite instructive and mirrors the authorities discussed above 
in the context of on-the-job training.154 The example involves an organization 
that trains students for the performing arts and generates funds from the sale 
of tickets to performances. The example concludes that the performances 
contribute importantly to the accomplishment of the organization’s exempt 
purpose. Accordingly, the income produced is from a substantially related 
trade or business and not subject to UBIT.
The IRS relied on this reasoning in Revenue Ruling 80-296 when it approved 
the sale of broadcast rights to collegiate sports games as a trade or business 
substantially related to the educational purpose of college athletics. It found 
that by exhibiting the game in front of a larger audience the organization 
promoted the school’s educational purpose. In Revenue Ruling 76-94, the IRS 
considered a business run by an organization dedicated to helping emotionally 
disturbed adolescents. The organization operated a grocery store at which 
many of the youth worked. Working in the store was an integral part of the 
therapy and aff ected other aspects of life at the residential facility. Students 
were paid for their work and could use their salaries to defray the costs of their 
stay. The IRS held that the activity was scaled to the organization’s exempt 
purpose and therefore was not an unrelated trade or business.155
A postgraduate legal training program designed in accordance with the 
principles described below in Part IV.B.5 should readily qualify as a related 
business and thereby avoid UBIT.
150. I.R.C. § 513(a)(2) (2012).
151. I.R.C. § 513 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (as amended 1983).
152. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (as amended 2008).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3).
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4), Ex. 1.
155. I.R.C. § 513 (2012).
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3.  Private Foundation or Public Charity Status
Although not a matter of tax exemption, the postgraduate legal training 
program must also consider whether it will be treated as a public charity or 
as a private foundation.156 This issue is important because public charities 
are provided much more latitude under the Code than private foundations. 
As noted above, private foundations must distribute a certain percentage 
of their income or assets for charitable purposes each year.157 The charitable 
contribution deduction under Code Section 170 is much less generous for 
donations to private foundations than to public charities.158 Additionally, 
private foundations face a bevy of excise taxes on behavior, such as self-dealing, 
excess business holdings, and a required demonstrated payout amount, that 
are costly to monitor and could restrict optimal functioning.159
Public charities are given more latitude because they typically have a 
broad public constituency, and Congress trusts that their activities are more 
likely to be in the broad interests of the public. Schools, hospitals, churches, 
and organizations that receive broad public support from fundraising are 
considered public charities. Private foundations, on the other hand, typically 
receive their support from one family or a few families.
Schools (educational organizations in the Code) are considered public 
charities, but postgraduate legal training programs are unlikely to qualify 
under this provision because they will not operate with a full-time faculty, 
a curriculum, and a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students.160 Under 
some circumstances, programs may qualify as public charities because they 
receive a substantial part of their support from either a governmental unit or 
from contributions of the public.161 Most likely, programs will qualify because 
they receive more than one-third of their support from a combination of 
contributions and grants and from the sale of goods or services, where the sale 
of those goods or services qualifi es as part of their exempt purpose.162
Alternatively, they might attempt to qualify as a supporting organization 
under section 509(a)(3). An in-depth discussion of supporting organizations 
156. I.R.C. § 509 (2012).
157. See Part IV.B.1, supra.
158. I.R.C. § 170(b) (2012).
159. See I.R.C. § 4941 (2012) (imposing a self-dealing excise tax on certain controlling persons of 
a private foundation); I.R.C. § 4942 (2012) (imposing an excise tax on a failure to distribute 
income; I.R.C. § 4943 (2012) (imposing an excise tax on excess business holdings).
160. Named organizations include churches, hospitals, and schools. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) 
(2012); I.R.C. § 509(a) (2012).
161. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (2012).
162. I.R.C. § 509(a)(2).
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is beyond the scope of this Article.163 However, such organizations have 
very close ties to the public charities they support, such that they, too, can 
be considered public charities, much as organizations performing essential 
functions for tax-exempt organizations may be considered exempt. Support 
is generally established through interlocking boards and other provisions 
designed to show the close connection and alignment of interests between the 
public charity and its supporting organization.164 Any program seeking tax 
exemption must consider how best to ensure that it falls on the public charity 
side of the line.
4.  A Model Postgraduate Training Program
Ideally, the IRS would issue clear guidance in the form of a revenue ruling 
making clear that postgraduate legal training programs can qualify for tax 
exemption and setting forth the parameters such programs must meet to 
qualify. Designing the specifi cs of such guidance is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, it would need to address both the scope of the educational 
activities required and the extent to which and at what price such programs 
could serve clients beyond those typically served by legal aid organizations.165
In the interim, those creating postgraduate training programs must make 
do with the guidance that does exist. While the current guidance does not 
provide the certainty one might desire, at least the tax considerations are 
consistent with both the educational and legal access goals most programs 
will have. First and foremost, it is critical to establish an independent exempt 
purpose, which in most cases will be educational. The clearly stated mission 
of any such program should be to train young lawyers in the practical aspects 
of lawyering. To be clear, a byproduct of this mission may be to provide free 
or low-cost legal services to those currently unable to aff ord lawyers. However, 
unless the program provides free or mostly free services to the poor, this is 
not the basis upon which we believe the postgraduate legal training program 
can acquire tax-exempt status under current guidance. Care must be taken 
163. For a discussion of supporting organizations, see Supporting Organizations Requirements and Types, 
I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profi ts/Charitable-Organizations/Supporting-
Organizations-Requirements-and-Types (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). Some may think of the 
supporting organization route as a method to obtain exemption. However, exemption for a 
supporting organization must be independently established. Some may confuse the notion 
of integral part discussed above in Part IV.B.
164. See id.
165. With regard to the latter, one possibility might be to follow California Corporation’s Code 
Section 13406(b), which permits law fi rms to be nonprofi t public benefi t corporations if they 
meet certain conditions, including that seventy percent of their clients must be lower income 
persons under the California Health and Safety Code, which is based on Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) guidelines. Such an approach would allow for a signifi cant 
range of eligible clients, while ensuring that the program was not simply competing in the 
regular legal market. CAL. CORP. CODE § 13406(b) (West 2015). Signifi cant care would be 
needed to ensure that the rules create enough leeway for such fi rms to break even or at least 
come close. Otherwise, such fi rms may face unsustainable fi nancial pressures.
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to ensure that providing legal services to middle-class individuals, even at 
reduced rates, does not rise to the level of a substantial non-exempt or the 
program’s primary purpose.
While it is important from a training perspective that the program’s on-
the-job training be as similar to a for-profi t operation as possible, from a tax 
perspective, care should be taken to distinguish the training activities from for-
profi t fi rms. The authorities taken as a whole reveal that organizations that look 
too much like for-profi t entities will not be granted tax exemption, whatever 
the doctrinal justifi cation may be.166 Only where commercial activities serve an 
exempt purpose or are incidental to an exempt purpose is exemption allowed. 
The following suggestions should strengthen the case for granting stand-alone 
postgraduate training programs exempt status.
First, classroom education activities should be signifi cantly greater than 
those found in for-profi t fi rms. Resident attorneys should be trained on a wide 
variety of topics, including practical skills, such as how to take depositions, 
draft contracts, and negotiate deals or settlements, and also cover the business 
of law, including how to price matters, bill clients, organize fi les, and use 
technology. Programs should consider forming close relationships with other 
nonprofi t organizations, such as the sponsoring law school or state bar, to 
provide such training. 
Second, care should be taken in the type of work selected. Work should not 
only be suitable to new lawyers, but it should also have signifi cant pedagogical 
value. For instance, simple divorces often require negotiations (both with the 
client and the opposing side) and limited discovery, and lead to short trials, all 
skills that young litigators need. Divorces can also often be completed within 
a year, thus giving the resident attorneys a good view of a case’s life cycle. 
In contrast, programs should probably avoid practices that consist mainly 
of fi lling out forms, on the one hand, and overly complex matters requiring 
signifi cant practice experience, such as reverse triangular mergers, on the 
other hand. Instead, they should focus on practice areas that young lawyers 
are likely to go into, such as family law, civil litigation, criminal defense, and 
transactional matters.
Third, the demands on the resident attorneys should be less than those 
found in for-profi t fi rms. Associates in such fi rms are often required to bill 
2000 hours, leaving little time for classroom learning or serious on-the-job 
mentoring. Resident attorneys should have billable expectations commensurate 
with their expanded classroom obligations and the expectation that they will 
be working closely with supervising attorneys who will treat each project as a 
teachable moment and learning opportunity. This will ensure that the on-the-
job training element is truly focused on education and scaled to that task.
Fourth, resident attorneys should be allowed to stay for no more than three 
years, by which time they will have learned suffi  cient skills to be considered 
166. See, e.g., B.S.W. Grp. Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352 (1978).
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practice-ready. This fl ips the for-profi t model on its head167 and mirrors the 
training program described in Rev. Rul. 73-128, where paid trainees moved 
on as soon as they developed suffi  cient skills to fi nd private-sector jobs. It 
also ensures that new positions will open each year and make these programs 
available to more new lawyers.
Fifth, the program should focus on areas or client groups that are not 
currently served by for-profi t fi rms, to minimize the extent to which the program 
competes with the private sector. While programs cannot focus exclusively on 
the poor absent outside funding, they could focus on the elderly,168 minority 
groups, or veterans, all of whom have signifi cant needs that are going unmet. 
Although not necessary,169 the program should set rates below market to reach 
these clients. Doing so strengthens the claim that the program is not competing 
with for-profi t businesses, but rather is serving clients the market has left 
behind. To be clear, we do not argue that providing low-cost legal services is 
a charitable purpose under current rules, though if structured to serve a class 
of citizens whose legal rights are going undefended, maybe it should be. If 
such activities are disproportionate to the training needs of the educational 
purpose, the fi rm could fail to obtain tax-exempt status. Nonetheless, it is 
consistent with the idea discussed in the context of public interest law fi rms 
that tax exemption may be appropriate for organizations that fi ll market gaps.
Sixth, the program should not be designed to turn a signifi cant profi t. 
Organizations that turn large profi ts seem far more commercial than charitable, 
even where the purpose of the activity is to advance an exempt purpose.170
Seventh, although the authorities permit charitable organizations to pay 
market rate salaries,171 paying the resident and supervising attorneys salaries 
commensurate with what public-sector lawyers make will further diff erentiate 
the program from for-profi t fi rms.
Eighth, eff orts should be taken to connect the program to other exempt 
organizations. For instance, it might be advisable to put leaders of legal-
focused nonprofi ts, such as the state bar or community legal services, on the 
organization’s board or use members of the school’s alumni organization 
to provide the classroom training. Creating a tight connection between the 
program and other tax-exempt organizations will highlight the program’s 
nonprofi t nature and may help it qualify as a supporting organization, for 
purposes of qualifying as a public charity, if necessary.
167. As noted above, most fi rms lose money on associates during the fi rst few years and only reap 
the benefi ts of any training provided thereafter. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 I.R.B. 145.
169. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-128, 1973-1 C.B. 222.
170. See Scripture Press Found. v. U.S., 285 F.2d 800, 805 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 
(1962) (fi nding that earning profi ts would be permissible under the destination of funds 
defi nition of “in furtherance of,” if the excess revenues were used to support an exempt 
purpose but that doing so might call into question the program’s primary purpose).
171. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2002).
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Programs should also consider creating a community board that includes 
individuals from the law school, the state bar, the court system, and important 
community leaders, who can ensure that the organization is thinking broadly 
about its mission and is focused on the community in which it operates. It 
might also be advisable to conduct a regular community needs assessment 
to determine how well it is fulfi lling the legal and educational needs of its 
community.172
Finally, and perhaps most important, the scale of the practice must be 
proportional to the training need.173 Getting the scaling correct will avoid the 
risk identifi ed in Rev. Rul. 73-127 that the commercial activity through which on-
the-job training occurs will be considered a substantial non-exempt purpose.174 
The raison d’etre for the program must be to train lawyers, not to perform 
legal work for clients. To ensure that this remains so, postgraduate training 
programs should ensure that every experienced lawyer in the organization 
is deeply involved in training the resident attorneys and that the resident 
attorneys are involved in most, if not all, of the legal work being conducted.
IV.  Conclusion
Over the past several years, a number of actors have begun to explore 
diff erent ways to provide the practical training necessary for new lawyers. 
While some are pushing for greater training within the law school curriculum, 
we believe that postgraduate legal training programs make the most sense. 
Such programs will provide a wide range of public benefi ts, from training 
new lawyers to helping address the lack of aff ordable legal services for a vast 
number of Americans.
In this Article, we explore a number of design concerns related to 
postgraduate legal training, including the relative merits of incubator and 
residency programs, whether such programs should be operated within law 
schools or as stand-alone entities, and whether they can and should qualify for 
tax-exempt status.
We conclude that a properly designed postgraduate legal training program 
operated within a school should pose no problems for a school’s tax-exempt 
status. Moreover, a properly designed stand-alone program should qualify for 
tax exemption under current guidance, even though it does not fi t easily within 
any existing categories for which tax exemption has routinely been granted. 
That said, we believe that the IRS should issue specifi c guidance in this area 
172. Congress recently imposed such a requirement on hospitals in Code Section 501(r). I.R.C. 
§ 501(r) (2012).
173. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-128 (deeming a toy-making business that trained workers and sold the 
output at market rates a means to a charitable end because there was a clear and distinct 
causal relationship between the training and the charitable purpose). See also Rev. Rul.  
76-94, 1976-1 C.B. 171; Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4), Ex. 1 (as amended 1983) (discussing this 
same issue in the context of UBIT).
174. The organization at issue in Rev. Rul. 73-127, 1973-1 C.B. 221, dedicated only four percent of 
its revenues to training. Id. at 1. 
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in the form of a revenue procedure to provide much-needed certainty and 
help facilitate the creation of such programs, an important step in addressing 
the gap between what students learn in law school and what they need to be 
practice-ready lawyers.
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